


CONFERENCE SCHEDULE *

Saturday, February 21

- 8:30 Light Breakfast (Provided)
- 9:00 Aaron Brooks, Florida State University
"Responsibility and Answers:
Why Angela Smith's Account of Responsibility as
Answerability Isn't Enough"
Commenter: Jonathan Shires, UF
- 10:00 Paul Ludwig, University of Florida
"A Defense of Reductionism as a Working
Hypothesis"
Commenter: Sam Sims, FSU
- 11:00 Lunch
- 1:00 Joshua Turkewitz, Florida State University
"The Site of Egalitarian Justice"
Commenter: Paul Ludwig, UF
- 2:00 Rileigh K. Merritt-Dietz, University of Florida
"Vitality in Deontology: The "Magnetism" of Kant's
Conception of the Good"
Commenter: Kyle Boerstler, FSU
- 3:00 Jorge Oseguera Gamba, Florida State University
"Debunking Moral Intuitionism:
The Reliability Objection and the Generalized-
Skepticism Reply"
Commenter: Rileigh K. Merrit-Dietz, UF
- 4:00 Andreas Falke, University of Florida
"Liar Liar... Manipulating Sexual Consent"
Commenter: Jeffery Haines, FSU

* All events will take place at Dodd Hall Auditorium
(DHA 103) unless noted otherwise.



- A: Dodd Hall Auditorium
- B: Strozier Library
Main campus library (Starbucks inside)
- C: Suwannee Room
Campus dining hall (several buffet-style options,
including vegetarian and vegan options)
- D: Pitaria
Mediterranean sandwiches and more
- E: William Johnston Annex
Chick-Fil-A, Rising Roll Gourmet Deli

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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

University of Florida
Florida State University
Graduate Conference



February 21, 2015

Structure of Presentations:

Presentation: 30 minutes
Comment & response: 15 minutes
Q&A: 10 minutes
Break: 5 minutes

Abstracts:

“Responsibility and Answers: Why Angela Smith’s Account of Responsibility as Answerability Isn’t Enough”

Aaron Brooks, Florida State University

In her forthcoming essay, “Responsibility as Answerability,” Angela Smith argues that a unified theory of moral responsibility is implicit in our day-to-day moral practices. She labels this unified concept ‘responsibility as answerability.’ The aim of this essay will be to explore possible objections to Smith’s view. These objections will center on the ability of her account to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for responsibility. My contention is that, though her account may rightfully be understood to supply the sufficient conditions of moral responsibility, it is debatable whether her account provides the necessary conditions.

Commenter: Jonathan Shires, UF

“A Defense of Reductionism as a Working Hypothesis”

Paul Ludwig, University of Florida

Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam offer reductionism as a working hypothesis for an overall philosophy of science. A unity of science through reductionism seems to be a plausible and desirable hypothesis. Alan Garfinkel argues against reductionism, claiming that the mechanism of reduction works in such a way that reduced theories lose explanatory power. Through an example of fox and rabbit populations Garfinkel shows how a reductionist answer gives a kind of explanation, but not the right kind. Garfinkel over estimates the explanatory power of his unreduced explanation and is partial to a certain kind of answer before he even starts analyzing the reductionist explanation. Reductionism offers a more complete explanation of the

rabbit and fox populations. Instead of dismissing reductionism because it does not offer the right kind of explanation, Garfinkel should let the explanation reshape the way he frames his scientific questions about the rabbit and fox populations.

Commenter: Sam Sims, FSU

“The Site of Egalitarian Justice” Josh Turkewitz, Florida State University

Institutionalism is the view that only a society’s basic structure the pervasive, powerful, publicly regulated, legitimately coercive, political, economic, and social institutions is subject to the demands of egalitarian justice. Kok-Chor Tan argues that Institutionalism is preferable to Personalism (the view that justice also places demands on individual actors) in light of value pluralism; the existence of legitimate competing conceptions of the good. I argue that Tan fails to show that Institutionalism is preferable in light of value pluralism, and that there are good reasons to prefer Personalism to Institutionalism.

Commenter: Paul Ludwig, UF

“Vitality in Deontology: The “Magnetism” of Kant’s Conception of the Good” Raleigh K. Merritt-Dietz, University of Florida

In the “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,” C.L. Stevenson claims the “good” has often been defined in terms of approval or similar attitudes (15). Stevenson presents three requirements with which the “vital” sense of good is expected to meet: (1) goodness must be a topic for intelligent disagreement; (2) goodness must be “magnetic”; and (3) goodness must not be discoverable solely through the scientific method. What of other analyses of good? In this paper, I aim to account for this question by analyzing Kant’s theory of the moral good to see if it can meet Stevenson’s requirements. In doing so, I shall specifically address concerns regarding the “magnetism” of Kant’s conception of the good. If a Kantian view can fulfill all of Stevenson’s requirements, then it is plausible to suppose you can have a conception of good that is “vital,” and it need not be an emotivist view..

Commenter: Kyle Boerstler, FSU

“Debunking Moral Intuitionism: The Reliability Objection and the Generalized- Skepticism Reply” Jorge Oseguera Gamba, Florida State University

Debunking arguments in today’s metaethical debate are arguments against moral realism, which start by assuming it and showing that, in conjunction with an evolutionary explanation of our moral intuitions, it leads to moral skepticism. Instead, my argument attacks moral intuitionism without having to make claims about moral realism. A common objection against moral intuitionism is that reasons have to be given for the reliability of our moral intuitions. I reinforce this objection with an explanation of the origin and the proximal causes of our moral intuitions, making it a debunking argument. The intuitionist reply is that if the objection were correct, then reasons would have to be given for the reliability of all intuitions, not just of the moral ones. This reply is rebutted by pointing out that the reliability of other kinds of intuitions is provided independently. If the reliability of moral intuitions is provided in the same way, then they are not justified prima facie, as moral intuitionists claim.

Commenter: Raleigh K. Merritt-Dietz, UF

“Liar Liar... Manipulating Sexual Consent” Andreas Falke, University of Florida

Recently, sexual violence on and near university campuses has received increased media attention. The related philosophical literature seems to focus on sexual violence, for instance in the form of date rape, as well. The general manipulation of sexual consent, however, receives very little attention. I argue that this is unfortunate for at least four reasons: a) such manipulation is likely more common than date rape and other forms of sexual violence, b) there is relatively little awareness of how serious of a moral wrongdoing it is, c) the reasons for it being wrong illuminate arguments made regarding date rape, and d) the reasons for it being wrong generalize, i.e. other types of manipulation, including very common non-sexual ones in relationships, are more morally problematic than often acknowledged—for the same reasons.

Commenter: Jeffery Haines

The Philosophy Graduate Student Association would like to thank the FSU Department of Philosophy and UF Department of Philosophy for its support in the organization of this conference.

