



Department of Philosophy

Bayles Lectures

The Bayles Lectures are sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and the Michael D. Bayles Lectureship Fund for Ethics.

January 19, 2007

3:30 p.m., 103 Dodd Hall Auditorium

"Pleasure and Pain"

Bernard Gert

Dartmouth College

November 7, 2003

3:30 p.m., 103 Dodd Hall Auditorium

"Enticing Reasons"

Jonathan Dancy

University of Reading

Abstract:

In this paper I consider the possibility of a general distinction between two sorts of reason, those that entice and those that are, as I will later say, more 'peremptory' in style. The main idea here is that some reasons are obviously in the business of more or less telling us what to do - moral reasons are an obvious case in point, but many reasons of prudence do the same (the reasons for having your brakes checked are peremptory, in my sense). Other reasons, however, are more to do with making an option attractive rather than demanded, required, or right.

I try to find theoretical room for enticing reasons. This turns out to be harder than one might expect. This is partly, but not only, because of mistaken preconceptions about the relation between two notions: those of a contributory reason and of 'ought'. Having broken the supposedly tight link between reasons and 'oughts', I face the question of the sense in which the concept of a reason is a normative notion, and this foreshadows me to ask what it

is for a concept to be normative. With something of an answer to this question, I return to the question whether enticing reasons are so different from others that they cannot be called normative at all.

April 2, 2001

4:00 p.m., 103 Dodd Hall Auditorium

"Hypocrisy"

David McNaughton

Keele University

Abstract:

Charges of hypocrisy, especially in political or public life, are common. This serious charge is used far too indiscriminately. There is a tendency to hold that all pretence, deceit or concealment is automatically hypocritical. We argue that hypocrisy is correctly used of quite a narrow range of cases in which, roughly, the hypocrite makes a parade of having an excellence of character which she does not possess and from which she is, to some degree, distanced. Often charges other than hypocrisy may be more appropriate: e.g. lying, cowardice, weakness of will or even free riding. Does accuracy matter here, or is it merely a matter of academic debate? It matters as much in the realm of public debate as it does in courts of law. It matters because, even if the accused is guilty of something, nevertheless different charges are sensitive to different evidence and may demand different responses. And it matters even more if the accused is innocent, because casualness in these matters can lead to injustice, to the public stigmatisation of conduct that is irreproachable and to gross invasion of privacy. Not all philosophers agree that hypocrisy should be narrowly defined. We take as our stalking horse an article on the topic by Crisp and Cowton in *American Philosophical Quarterly* (October 1994), who identify hypocrisy with any failure to take morality seriously. We take issue with them on a number of questions, which include:

- What motives can underlie hypocrisy? Is shame one of them?
- Can dissimulation of character in a good cause be branded hypocritical?
- Is all dissimulation of character in a bad cause hypocritical?
- Need hypocrisy be self-conscious?
- What kinds of supposed excellence can be pretended to hypocritically?
- Is it always hypocritical to blame someone for a fault when one has (similar) faults oneself?
- Is it hypocritical to say: 'Do as I say, not as I do'?
- Is a concern for the letter rather than the spirit of morality hypocrisy?