PHILOSOPHY, PRAGMATISM, AND HUMAN BONDAGE

A S BEFITS the honor which you have conferred upon me on this occasion, I propose to speak to you in behalf of philosophy against some of the forces which I think are today traducing it. Philosophy being so much bigger than any philosopher or any of the many and diverse attempts that have been made to define it, I shall not presume to speak for all of it. The point of view which you are asked to assume is that of our present human situation. How does philosophy appear from that standpoint?

It was uncommon wisdom that inspired George Herbert Mead, in his functional analysis of the self, to recognize the conflict that is never completely resolved between the "I" and the "me," between what are relatively the dictates of the heart and the dictates of the head. The "I" can never be fully incorporated in or embraced by the "me," and vice versa, because the "me" or generalized other, as the introjected or internalized mind of the community, is always more or less the alien other to what is felt to be uniquely and most significantly one's self. There is much more to the self than there is to the mind, as we recognize in saying that we have minds but are selves. I cherish the memory of Mead as a true philosopher and great teacher because he tellingly exemplified, and succeeded in communicating to his students, this endless struggle between the "I" and the "me." Mead did not honor articulate speech and the clear and distinct ideas of reason the less, he honored life, impulse, feeling, desire, sensitivity, and imagination or vision the more, by his unflagging effort to transmute the elusive but life-affirming, and ever freshly emerging "I" into the intelligible and objective terms of the "me."

1 Presidential address delivered before the twenty-second annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at Stanford University, California, December 27, 28, 29, 1948.
2 Mind, Self and Society (1934), pp. 196-213, passim.
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Now the bearing of this distinction on the theme I wish to treat is this. A man who aspires to be a philosopher has to be true to himself, and this requires uncommon candor. He must say not only what is on his mind but also what is in his heart, as far as this is possible. He must try and try again to close the awful gap between the “in” and the “on,” between the “I” and the “me,” between creative, liberating intelligence and conventional, imprisoning thought. In proposing to close this gap, I am proposing to elicit clear and distinct ideas about this aspect of human, including the philosopher’s, experience. I am seeking to be empirical.

The justification for focusing our attention upon the human situation in terms of the “I” and the “me” is that philosophers have pretty much ignored it to the detriment of philosophy and of human life, and at a time when the fragmentation of human life has become a conscious indictment of philosophy and of education in general. It is pertinent to add that the scientists have not ignored the problem. In fact, we are witnessing a curious exchange of roles on the part of scientists and philosophers, such that scientists are tending increasingly to see things in their togetherness while philosophers are tending to see things apart. It is interesting too that in this tendency toward a reversal of roles, the scientist shows little if any regard — in fact, to a large extent complete disregard — for the philosopher, while the philosopher tends increasingly to pride himself on becoming a scientist.

I. THE HUMAN SITUATION TODAY

With this general statement of aims, let us begin with a report of the human situation in its own terms, leaning toward the lower limit of the fact-conjecture continuum, of course commenting where this seems necessary, but putting our philosophical theories as far as possible in abeyance, and putting ourselves in readiness to find what is strange in what has been familiar.

Almost wherever I turn today, whether to novelists, poets, and dramatists, whose authority rests on knowledge by intimacy of acquaintance; whether to political and social news or broadcasts; whether to social scientists, psychologists, and the more specialized students of psychodynamics; whether to the now socially and morally conscious physicists, chemists, and biologists who talk of atom bombs,
germ warfare, and the threat of the dehumanization of science; whether to students and laymen who have come to me distressed; whether to old or new acquaintances at cocktail parties where people are seeking diversion and enjoyment—almost wherever I turn I either come flush upon human distress or an ill-concealed effort to hide or dispel it. In lesser or greater degree, the "I" is being drowned in the "me." Psychoanalysts, delving into the "unconscious," are spotlighting the deep-seated and widespread nature of the inner conflicts of our time and are showing how thin is the line that separates many of these conflicts from neurotic behavior. Sociologists are helping psychoanalysts to receive a serious hearing by augmenting the evidence for the general thesis that our capitalistic society is shot through and through with frustration and aggression. The evidence that is piling up for the increase in sadistic and masochistic aggression is evidence of human bondage. The welter of conflicting theories of the causes of aggression indicates, by the complexity of the problem, how far the human situation has gotten out of hand.

The philosopher's complaint of the revolt against reason, with which I sympathize, has to reckon with the religionist's complaint of the revolt against God. The revival of religion, of religious superstitions, even on the part of many educated people who we may think should know better, is not as strange as the tough-minded among us take it to be. When people describe their condition by saying that they feel as though they are falling into a bottomless pit, that there is nothing to hold on to, that there is no use to turn to other people and no use to turn to themselves, that science and reason have failed them, that their political leaders are as daffy as they are, and are leading them into yet another war too dreadful to think about, what refuge is there for the inarticulate "I" against the social pressure of the "me"—save blind faith? Perhaps the blindness is ours in calling all kinds of faith equally blind. Perhaps in the spirit of William James we should delve deeper into the psychology of the religious experience and see that ideals must perish if there is no way of keeping them alive, no way of avoiding the pathetic fallacy, no way of rationalizing our deepest hopes against our greatest fears. Man's faith that the world can be made to realize his dreams will be altogether blind only when that faith is dead. What makes human bondage critical today is the impoverishment of reason or of the "me" which is due to the
divorce of reason from a sustaining faith. The greatest disservice to man's reason is the sterile supposition, so characteristic of our culture and so blatant in our philosophy, that man can live or should live by reason alone. Reason and faith go down together when reason is permitted to become man's master rather than his servant.

Now it is a familiar fact of human psychology that deeply painful experiences due to frustrated desires become, as far as possible, repressed. Repression and resistance are basic terms in theories of motivation and psychodynamics. The conscious "me" resists, represses, and seeks to cover up, as though in this way it could obliterate, the deepest feelings of the "I." There is a limit to what people can endure, a considerably lower limit to what they can endure on the conscious level of experience. People don't like to hear of our troubles any more than we like to attend to them ourselves. Hence out of politeness to others as well as out of self-protection, the "me" comes to serve as a protective barrier against the hostile forces, or what appear as such, both within and without what is most truly ourselves.

The psychological mechanism underlying this attitude may be called the principle of selection; and I submit that it is necessary to lift this principle from the level of unconscious operation to the level of explicit awareness because this attitude is as pervasive in human experience today as it is unnecessary. And I suggest that philosophers reflect human experience in general, and the present crisis of that experience in particular, in their detachment from matters emotional, sensational, or alarming, and in their preference for matters that can without too much difficulty be thought about in terms of habitual categories. Like other human beings, the philosopher represses the "I" and subordinates it to the "me" without awareness of his principle of preference or selection, and what is worse, without critical inquiry as to the causes in his culture and in himself for the preference. This principle of selection is an idol of the tribe that can be exposed for what it is only through penetrating understanding of self and other people.

Closely related to the principle of selection is what I propose to call the principle of indifference. Much of the surface calm that people are showing today is a calm that borders on contemptuous indifference, based on repressed fear and on loss of faith and hope. People are losing the sense of personal responsibility for what is going to happen.
to them; their future, they feel, is beyond their control. Not being able, or rather not feeling able, to make a difference in the course of events, they assume a protective attitude of indifference. The principle of indifference expresses itself in all sorts of ways. When I become impatient with a discussion, as I fear I too frequently do, and say: "You are just talking to hear yourself talk; why not be yourself?" the answer frequently is the candid confession that the talk is compensatory, a device for hiding from or escaping the self, the "I," which is too inarticulate, bewildered, and beaten down to be able to think and speak for itself.

What is here called the principle of indifference is not introduced as an original idea. It reflects the tendency in modern life to reduce the individual to a thing (the "I" to the "me"), which has been noted, under various names, by almost all students concerned with the sciences of man. A world that treats us as things invites from us a reciprocal attitude. And in having access to ourselves only from the outside, in terms of the "me," we are quite consistent in regarding others from the outside; the loss of self-respect goes hand in hand with the loss of respect for others. Man's indifference to himself and indifference to other selves are the twin faces of man as creature; they represent man's profound sense of failure as creator. Thus power over others becomes the principal modus vivendi, the cheap substitute for the sense of intrinsic power that we have lost. Rationalizing this inner motivation, people tell me that it is a case of exploiting others lest they themselves be exploited; and business enterprise gives point enough to this logic. However, we have only to gain people's confidence in our own sincerity, in our respect for their submerged ego-ideal, to unmask this logic as a piece of rationalization which, while ingenious, doesn't ultimately satisfy the very individuals who most strongly defend it. It only extends and makes more insidious the process of self-estrangement and estrangement from others.

This impressionistic account of what we have called the human situation is reinforced by the data which have been brought to light by the various social and psychological sciences. From the mass of the available evidence, let us briefly consider a few facts pertinent to our theme and revealing most strikingly this trend of our age, whether we prefer to characterize it as "The Tidal Wave of Modern Unhappi-
Take the social problem of divorce. More than 20 per cent of marriages now end in divorce, and the rate of increase of divorce to married population has been 30 per cent a decade, a rate, if continued, which would show, in the year 1965, about 51 per cent of American marriages ending in divorce. More significant for our purpose is the abundant evidence, not yet in statistical form, that in the majority of divorcees the ability to give and receive love is lost long before the divorce. The number of unhappy marriages that are simply endured has been conservatively estimated as at least equal to the number of divorces. If Erich Fromm is right, as I think he is, in signaling love and potency along with knowledge as the defining marks of the productive and moral character pattern, are not impotence, sterility, hate, and indifference problems that should challenge philosophic inquiry? What can a theory of value amount to without them?

Consider next the falling birth rate. Aside from the temporary wartime rise, the rate has fallen steadily since 1810, when there were more than 950 children under 5 years of age for every 1,000 women 15 to 44 years of age. By 1850 the total had dropped to fewer than 700; by 1900 it was approximately 500; in 1930 it sank below 400, and it continued to sink up until the last war. Significant too is the positive correlation between fewer children and increasing divorce, five out of every six cases of divorce stemming from childless marriages. Moreover, women are failing to give birth, in most cases, not because of disease or structural defect, but because of more or less severe emotional disorder. It may be putting it on a bit thick to refer to modern woman as the lost sex, but my inquiries have disclosed very few women who are basically happy.

To dismiss these and other facts that could be adduced as merely psychological and sociological is to overlook the fact that philosophers are human beings whose quality as humane or inhumane or indifferent will necessarily be reflected in their philosophy. Whether Lundberg and Farnham are right in calling modern woman the lost sex, I do not know; but I believe that the problem is of far-reaching significance, obviously reflecting upon men as much as upon women.

In addition to divorce and falling birth rate, we might mention the rising homicide rate and the increase in the number of suicides; we might observe the increase in hostility and destructiveness in general; we might note the evidence which Fromm and other students of psychology have subsumed under the general heading of the "unlived life." We might even reconsider the traditional view according to which crime is due to heredity, poverty, slums, or other obviously unfavorable environmental conditions. Lundberg and Farnham report that crime "is present in every modern social layer, and is most manifest at the top of the social pyramid, decreasing in strength and harmfulness as one moves downward."

With regard to upper-layer or "white-collar" crime, in particular, these authors quote a long and telling passage from an article by Edwin H. Sutherland, who declares that the most general, although not universal, characteristic of this top-layer type of crime is violation of trust. By violation of trust is meant "the obtainment of money under false pretenses" through misrepresentations "in the financial statements of corporations, in the advertising and other sales methods, in manipulations on the stock exchange, in short weights and measures and in the misgrading of commodities, in embezzlement and misapplication of funds, in commercial bribery, in the bribery of public officials, in tax frauds, and in the misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies." But more significant for our purpose is the fact that Sutherland, a sociologist, is compelled to explain violation of trust in moral terms consequential for philosophy. The "fifty-million dollar losses" that are not uncommon in "the large-scale crimes committed by corporations, investment trusts, and public utility holding companies" he states as the least important of the consequences for society. Much more important is the fact that white-collar crimes destroy morale and promote social disorganization for want of effective moral leadership. The leaders of society themselves belong to the upper socioeconomic class which is infected by the "psychic disorganization which is at the root of so much other aberrant human behavior today." White-collar crimes thus raise a question for the philosopher as to his class status and its effect on his sense of personal responsibility and on his theories. Perhaps the sociology of knowledge

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is a question inseparable from the nature and ethical import of knowledge.

This catalogue of human failures is aptly “night”-capped by the evidence drawn from alcoholism and problem drinking, which is distinctly peculiar to our age and to just about all ages within our age. We needn’t waste time on moral platitudes; what is significant in our context is the light thrown by problem drinking on the attempts of the individual self to regain its bearings in a world riddled with contradictions. Anything that can, if only temporarily, buck a man up when he is down, relax his nerves from killing tension induced by the mad pace of our living, bring dreamless sleep in protection against thinking that only further complicates an already too-complicated pattern of living; anything that can bring a person to believe that everybody is somebody and a friend, including himself, and that the world, stripped from its conventional veneer, is a wonderful and soul-satisfying place to live in; anything that can bring relief from unrequited love, transmute moaning into laughter, nonsense into sense, liabilities into assets that won’t freeze till tomorrow; anything that can make an ambitious capitalist confess confidentially the emptiness of his gains and make him throw his money around on less fortunate but, as he thinks, worthier people; anything that makes philosophers and academicians in general more human, more communicable and intelligible, more modest and humble, more sensitive to the things that humanly matter, more aware of the connection between matter and what matters—well, such an all-purpose potion is not to be thrown down the drain even if an overdose can be deadly. Uninhabited people are going to fill up one way or another.

II. The Philosophical Situation

So much for the melancholy prelude. Let us turn now from the human to the philosophical situation, viewing it broadly and at first with nonprofessional eyes so as to gain whatever benefit we can from seeing ourselves as others see us. The philosopher’s “I” and “me” may come into sharper focus in this inspection.

What then, when candidly expressed, is the judgment of philosophy by an outside observer? It is that the philosopher knows much too little of what he is talking about in case he presumes to be talking
about a world that includes human beings, and that he is talking at best very strangely if he presumes to be concerned with anything else. Macneile Dixon in his Gifford Lectures on "The Human Situation" puts the nonprofessional's case against philosophy pithily: "When philosophers begin to substitute words for things one tires of their company." What he means, of course, is that good words take hold of things, show wide and deep experience with things, enhance our appreciation of things, and aid us in controlling things. But Dixon speaks so well for himself that I quote him at some length.

Foreigners express astonishment at the insularity of English thought.... Yet I find in myself a greater astonishment at the remoteness of philosophers from the world in which they live. One wishes they would thumb the leaves of the historical record before they constructed their admirable theories. They should, after the manner of the artists, have made some preliminary studies. They should have cultivated the acquaintance of plotters and revolutionaries, of angry souls in underground dwellings. They would write more convincingly if they consorted, even in imagination, with cave-dwellers, talked with buffoons, and mountebanks, and charlatans, with sadists and pimps and procurers, as well as with priests, prophets and professors. They might have learned something from the cynics and courtesans as well as from philanthropists, from beserker fighters, stark men, quicker with a blow than a word, whose joy was more in the argument of steel with steel than of sentence with sentence, "with heroes who thought death in battle, hot corpses high heaped for a pillow," the only form of death worthy of a man.... What have Hegel or Kant to say of such people, or the structure of their minds?

This analysis squarely attributes to the philosopher the chronic disease of academicians in general which one would think the true philosopher would resist at all costs. The price of nonconforming to academic canons of respectability, scholarship, or research is negligible as compared with the price of isolation from the human scene, euphemistically masked as scientific detachment. People instinctively turn away from philosophers because philosophic detachment only writes large and, what is worse, seems to adopt as a principle the irrelevancy and hostility of thought to what is basic in human feeling. Philosophers have become habituated, one suspects, to judge themselves as "philosophers" rather than as men.

Now if philosophers could be psychoanalyzed, they would probably come to appreciate the following remark quoted by Dixon: "A man

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6 In 1937.
8 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
Thinking that has lost its perspective can become a disease. Rationality apart from the sentiment of rationality may be taken as synonymous with reason, but it can never rightly be taken as synonymous with reasonableness, any more than thought can be taken as equivalent to thoughtfulness, or than signification can be taken as one with significance. Intelligence is much more than a running to and fro through neatly swept corridors of thought; it has to rest on a firm moral base; it has to have windows and skylights so that there will be room for communion to enliven communication. While loath to succumb to superstition, it should not be afraid of being dubbed religious. The anomaly of the scientific trend in current philosophy is its assumption that there will be faith in reason after reason has openly declared its complete divorce from faith. What people in bondage are looking to philosophers for is a rational faith for living. They find philosophy to be the cult of unintelligibility, as Cornelius Benjamin aptly describes it in the title of his presidential address to the Western Division of this Association last year. According to Benjamin’s version, the philosopher’s dilemma is that of either being simple-minded and communicating the obvious or of trying to communicate what is important and being muddledheaded. This statement of the philosopher’s dilemma is indeed an inescapable conclusion if we implicitly accept what constitutes traditionally the notion of empirical analysis.

No philosopher today is so divorced from the human scene that he wishes to be regarded as unempirical. In fact, empiricisms are a dime a dozen; but what a weasel word “experience” has turned out to be. Though, in the name of empiricism, philosophers have almost invariably proceeded from the materials of perceptual experience, they have seldom done this after the manner of what ordinary people would call men of perception. The ordinary man prefers his perceptions unsliced, and if they must be sliced, he prefers them sliced thick, with a notation that the slicing has occurred, and for what purpose. The pernicious anemia of philosophers he attributes to their liking their perceptions sliced thin, the thinner the better, with the result that the typical object of their perceptions is the so-called “physical object,” if perchance there is any actual object at all. The result of this “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” has been that what functions in

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perception as desire or purpose or feeling is trimmed away and tossed into a subjective garbage pail, with the lid shoved down tight, lest the objective world, the world tagged real, become contaminated. And we should not be fooled by the term "real," a value term signifying the philosopher's peculiar preference.

"The kernel of the scientific outlook," wrote Lord Russell, "is the refusal to regard our desires and interests as affording a key to the understanding of the world." And Dixon makes the only proper comment: "This is the superb gesture with which we are familiar. Mention your feelings to these men of iron, our scientific friends, and you will be met with a cold stare and the acid enquiry, 'My dear sir, what have your feelings to do with the matter?'"\(^{10}\) Obviously nothing, we should have to reply, if the world that is the object of our understanding is Russell's world, or rather the world that he claims as the object. Obviously everything, we should have to add, if the world that we are trying to understand is big enough to include Russell and possibly even lesser lights.

Russell's statement brings to a focus what I have been trying to describe as the root of human bondage today. The superb gesture with which we are all too familiar is the *reductio ad absurdum* of philosophy and of human intelligence. It is salutary counsel to be told that our wishes and desires can lead to wishful and deceptive thinking, but what makes this salutary and worth saying is that we do not wish to be deceived. That some wishes and feelings lead to phantasy, faulty observation, muddled thinking is no reason for putting the lid on all wishes and feelings. When philosophers tell us that we see what we are looking for, rather than what is objectively there, they invite the rejoinder that they likewise see what they are looking for, and that no perceptions are utterly aimless or devoid of feeling. What matters is the quality of the feeling, whether it is sensitive and discriminating and appreciative, or whether it is callous and indifferent and reaching only the hard surface of things. And what matters is that things perceived are things had, are things enjoyed or suffered, felt as favorable or unfavorable, consequential or inconsequential, are things of use and abuse, and are things or objects at all only owing to their qualitative immediacy and uniqueness as felt. Thus, any genuinely empirical knowledge presupposes the objectivity of feeling.

\(^{10}\) *Ibid.*, p. 60.
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Now the "scientific" philosopher's assertion of the privacy of feeling is speciously plausible today because, as our account makes only too clear, our deepest feelings are in fact subjective, feelings of privation, loneliness, frustration. The creative "I" is repressed, driven to cover inwardly, and rendered impotent by the alien and unfeeling "me." Sentiment is repressed out of fear of sentimentality. Love shrivels in shame. Since there is a market value on selling and buying, but not on giving, since there is a premium on acquisition, what passes for love is itself possessiveness and exploitation.

What gives the philosopher's assertion of the privacy of feeling sinister plausibility is the fact that, by putting his weight behind the demand for "objectivity" (things "designated" as over against feelings "expressed"), he only drives deeper the wedge by which our culture has separated the "I" from the "me." The philosophical realist may think he is miles apart from the man in the market place who prides himself on being unsentimentally realistic, practical, or intelligent; but he is closer than he thinks. By treating experience essentially as experiencing rather than as nature experienced, he encapsules the self. By conjuring up a preposterous bifurcation of nature, he robs nature of aesthetic, moral, and spiritual qualities that once made us feel at home there; and he evacuates our feelings and desires of all hope of their natural productive function in outward consummation. Man wants no part of a world that has become mostly empty space, and if the philosopher can provide him with no other world, he will withdraw into himself where the philosopher has put him. The scientific philosopher can scoff at the present reactionary trend toward supernaturalism, in and out of philosophy, but what alternative does he as a scientific empiricist provide? And little wonder that philosophy as a significant intellectual enterprise is lost if the lay observer must choose between supernaturalist obscurantism and an empiricism which is almost exclusively concerned with the development of linguistic analysis and other purely technological skills. Let us by all means have a scientific philosophy, but let us not lose the substance of the noun philosophy in the form of the adjective scientific.

It has been my thought that by coming at the philosophical situation from the vantage ground of the human situation we might agree that there is the same bifurcation in both, each reinforcing the other, and that the basic trouble with philosophy today is the spurious notion of
what constitutes empiricism. By examining now, even briefly, what brought about an enfeebled empiricism, how it was that the principle of selection and the principle of indifference came to rob experience of its human significance, turning the “I” against the “me,” and cutting the mind off from nature, we can then venture some constructive proposals for the recovery of philosophy. Indeed a good diagnosis of a disease will itself suggest the remedy.

It is well known how modern empiricism, ambivalent in Locke’s treatment, and initially naïve, came to grief in the skepticism of Hume. It is to the credit of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume that they at least tried to analyze firsthand experience with something like full awareness of the direct connection between philosophy and the problems of men in their day. The upshot of empirical analysis was, however, as Hume had the candor to say, the absurd notion of experience as a bundle of perceptions, minus either a subject or an object to tie it together, and Hume’s skepticism, the reductio ad absurdum of philosophy and of human life, has stalked the premises of both to this day. Locke, the apostle of human freedom, spokesman for the Revolution of 1688, tried to state experience in terms that would do justice to the “I” as a creative agent and as at home with the “me” and with the world. In doing this, he by-passes the psychophysical dualism of Descartes, only to have it catch up with him later. In the end he could not avoid the trap of psychophysical dualism, and perception became a subjective state of mind as over against a world of ghostly substantiality. The die was cast, and empiricism took flight through one blind alley after another.

The trouble with British empiricism and most of the empiricist tradition is not that it was initially naïve; it was not naïve enough, not true enough to what men were doing and feeling as a result and expression of their hard-won freedom in science, government, and social life. Science was demonstrating the power of creative human intelligence, the power of knowledge as human agency for transforming precarious and accidental natural events into dependable mechanisms for consummating human purposes. What the scientist did was to analyze not the object of perception but the causal structure in which objects in their qualitative immediacy are embedded. Thus the scientist did not pass judgment on the ontological status of the perceptual world; he merely exhibited the causal conditions for rendering more
secure the aesthetic, moral, and practical objects of our experience. In this he behaved very much as the artist does, since both of them convert material into objects as ends, though concerned with different aspects of experience. By ruling out final causes, the scientist was not at all ruling out the notion of a purposive universe; quite to the contrary, he was only transferring the locus and agency of purpose from the dead past or a utopian future to the living human present. In short, science was empiricism actively at work, demonstrating the potency and dignity of man, showing that possible worlds are not just conceivable worlds but worlds that man, if wise in his choice, can bring to pass.

How far philosophical empiricism strayed from this description of scientific empiricism is clearly recorded in history, in contemporary philosophy, and in the present pattern of our culture. It is the reason for this that we are concerned about. Being occupationally and culturally conditioned to view ideas — those especially qualified ideas that pass for our most important knowledge — as a revelation of ultimate Reality, philosophical empiricists were unable to take science operationally and contextually; they had to erect a metaphysics out of it. So instead of regarding science as an instrument to be put to work in the interest of man, they regarded it as man's master, as God incarnate, as a final revelation of Reality, little realizing that this was the surest way of making science subservient to the forces of reaction and of defeating the purpose of science. The philosophical empiricist committed what has been called the intellectualist fallacy that has been haunting philosophy ever since, by mistaking the scientific end product of inquiry for the original objects experienced, i.e., the presupposed context of the analysis. Thus the mechanical nature of the world as outcome of analysis came to be interpreted as a denial of any purposiveness in the world at all, even a denial of what one would think is the obvious purposiveness of the human activity of the scientist in making the analysis. Likewise, the mechanical and determinate nature of the world, as outcome of analysis, ruled out the factual or objective character of the problematic situation which alone gave point to the analysis. The indeterminate situation — which is precisely what we previously called the human situation — was taken to be purely subjective, a state of mind, no part of the real world. Man's sense of creative intelligence and of personal responsibility was virtually destroyed.
There was a place in the world for the mechanical and routine "me"; but the "I" was left dangling outside the world in a position from which, at best, it could only observe the passing parade of the wooden soldiers.

This being the way that empiricism went wrong, we have now to note the theoretical consequences for the theory of value corresponding to the practical consequences which I have labeled human bondage. Both in theory and in practice we have set science over against religion, morality, and art. And we have done this despite the fact that science, operationally considered, is an art through and through and could not be conducted without an implicit recognition of moral virtues and values associated with our religious heritage. We have set fact over against value, that which can be designated and objectively verified as against that which can be subjectively expressed and emotetd. Our feelings, as Russell has told us, can have nothing to do with the world.

This fallacy is directly relevant to the interminable discussions about the subjective or objective status of values. Most interest theories of value, like the emotive theories, treat value as subjective. The logic seems to be this: values must be either subjective or objective; since they are not objective they must be subjective. The way was prepared for this logic by traditional epistemology, physics being taken pre-emptively as science and as final authority as to what is to be regarded as objective fact. Tertiary, secondary, and finally even the traditional holdouts, the primary qualities of objects, were dumped into the mind. Why this had to be done, being so completely at odds with human experience before it had grown pathological, and being so far removed from physical science itself, operationally considered, has never been explained. To say that values must be objective or subjective is not logical but pathological; it is a case of the either-or fallacy, for values are experienced as qualities of objects within the activity of individuals which gives the objects their meaning and function. A truly empirical or scientific theory of value is looking to the field theory of a behavioristic psychology and of the social sciences, not to theoretical physics, for its basic frame of reference. It finds this frame of reference in the indissoluble organism-environment transaction, not in the subject-object or mind-world distinction.

It is not proposed here to offer an empirical or scientific theory of
value, but our theme of human bondage indicates the direction which
it should take. Human bondage gives point and poignancy to the the-

sis that the main concern of philosophy should be the nature of the

world with man in it as its central fact. This is simply because man is

man, man is the central fact, and there is no getting away from him.

To take man as central is to take his problems seriously, and this re-

quires recognition that the problem of knowledge and the problem of

valuation are not at bottom two problems but are one and the same

problem. The main point of the thesis that knowing is active on-going

inquiry which transforms an unsettled problematic situation (organ-

ism-environment transaction) into a settled and satisfactory situation,

and is not an apprehension, in the mind of a subject, of what is in-

dependently real, is this: a problematic situation is a situation of

need-demand, and a need-demand situation is a human situation.

Moreover, it is what everybody recognizes as an unsatisfactory situ-

ation. This fact alone should be sufficient to scotch all subjective

theories of value. Need-demand is something quite different from

arbitrary volitional decisions or subjective tastes; it sits in judgment,

so to speak, on those decisions and tastes. Theories of value will begin

to be empirical and scientific therefore when they dare formulate

propositions which not only describe people's tastes, preferences, and

desires but genuinely resolve the ever-increasing complexity of the

need-demand relations in the contemporary human and social situ-

ation.

With the imperative character of these need-demand relations, we

bring our present inquiry to a close, though this ending is more

properly a beginning if the main conclusions of the inquiry are sound.

It has been submitted that only by overcoming its sterile bifurcation

of theory and practice, knowledge and value, object and subject, will

philosophy overcome its present estrangement from the kind of prob-

lems which the human situation, as outlined above, would consider as

most significant and urgent. When the "I" is experiencing a crisis,

understanding the "I" is that kind of resolute thinking-desire that

stands under the "I" and the objective conditions of need-demand. So

philosophy is assigned a kind of revolutionary role, and this all the

more so when, as at present, the threats against the freedom of the self
to be itself are serious and insistent. It goes without saying that the

philosophical enterprise, as envisaged here, is doomed from the start
unless it can protect the freedom and integrity of the academic profession as a whole. By turning its attention away from things as they are to the way in which things are connected in passage, and by giving man an appreciable control over things in passage, science has imposed a heavy responsibility upon philosophy, the responsibility for becoming scientific about the ends of life as well as about the means for achieving these ends. The objective need-demand situation makes the philosophical enterprise perform a genuine service, mediating between the rich complexity of human life as immediately experienced and suffered and the objective causal structure exhibited by the sciences. So it is that a kind of pragmatism has emerged in our inquiry as a hopeful tertium quid between philosophy and human bondage, pragmatism signalizing the militant faith of the "I" in creative human intelligence.

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