**R A N D O L P H C L A R K E**

Department of Philosophy

151 Dodd Hall

Florida State University

Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500

rkclarke@fsu.edu

**Education**

Princeton University, Ph.D., Philosophy, 1990.

Virginia Commonwealth University, B.A. with High Honors, Philosophy, 1981.

**Professional History**

2006-present Florida State University, Professor

Director of Graduate Studies, 2009-present

Associate Chair, 2009-present

2004-2006 University of Georgia, Professor

1998-2004 University of Georgia, Associate Professor

1993-1998 University of Georgia, Assistant Professor

1991-1993 Lafayette College, Visiting Assistant Professor

1990-1991 North Carolina State University, Visiting Assistant Professor

**Areas of Specialization**

Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, and Ethics

**Areas of Competence**

Early Modern Philosophy

**Grants and Fellowships**

*National and International*

2019-20 Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellowship, Princeton University

Center for Human Values, “Human Agency and Moral Responsibility.”

2012-13 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, “Omissions.”

2012-13 National Humanities Center Fellowship, “Omissions.”

2012 John Templeton Foundation Grant, “Freely Omitting to Act.”

2000-2001 George A. and Eliza Gardner Howard Foundation Fellowship,

“Libertarian Free Will.”

1996 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar, “Metaphysics

of Mind.”

1993 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute, “Naturalism.”

1992 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar,

“Responsibility in the Real World.”

*University*

2010 Florida State University Council on Research & Creativity Grant,

“Omissions”

2006 University of Georgia Senior Faculty Research Grant, “Making Up One’s

Mind.”

2003 University of Georgia Senior Faculty Research Grant, “Action and the

Formation of Belief.”

2001 University of Georgia Senior Faculty Research Grant, “Libertarian Free

Will.”

2000 University of Georgia Senior Faculty Research Grant, “Libertarian Free

Will.”

1999 University of Georgia Senior Faculty Research Grant, “Libertarian Free

Will.”

1998 University of Georgia Junior Faculty Research Grant, “Emergence.”

1996-1997 Humanities Center Research Fellow, University of Georgia.

1996 University of Georgia Junior Faculty Research Grant, “Freedom and

Nature.”

1994 University of Georgia Junior Faculty Research Grant, “Two Kinds of

Agent Causation.”

**Books Authored**

*Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility*. New York: Oxford University

Press, 2014.

*Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

• Chapter 3 reprinted in *Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, vol. III, ed.

John Martin Fischer, 112-42. London: Routledge, 2005.

**Books Edited**

*The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays*, with Michael McKenna and Angela M.

Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

**Journal Articles**

“Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*,

forthcoming.

“Free Will, Agent Causation, and ‘Disappearing Agents’,” *Noûs* 53 (2019), 76-96.

“Absence Causation for Causal Dispositionalists,” *Journal of the American Philosophical*

*Association* 4 (2018), 323-31.

“Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism,” *Journal of Ethics* 20 (2016), 121-37.

“Abilities to Act,” *Philosophy Compass* 10 (2015), 893-904.

“Free Will and Agential Powers” (with Thomas Reed), *Oxford Studies in Agency and*

*Responsibility*, vol. 3, ed. David Shoemaker, 6-33. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2015.

“Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments” (with Joshua

Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn Repko Waller, and Chris Zarpentine),

*Philosophical Psychology* 28 (2015), 279-93.

“A Dialogue on Free Will,” *Methode* 2, No. 3 (2013), 41-45.

“Some Theses on Desert,” *Philosophical Explorations*, special issue on Basic Desert,

Reactive Attitudes, and Free Will, 16 (2013), 153-64.

• Reprinted in *Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will*, ed. Maureen

Sie and Derk Pereboom, 57-68. London: Routledge, 2015.

“What Is an Omission? *Philosophical Issues* 22 (2012), 127-43.

“Absence of Action,” *Philosophical Studies* 158 (2012), 361-76.

“Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities,” *Modern Schoolman* 88, No. 1-2 (2012),

161-69.

“Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological*

*Research* 82 (2011), 594-624.

“Are We Free To Obey the Laws?” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 47 (2010), 389-

401.

“Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological*

*Research* 80 (2010), 523-50.

“Opposing Powers,” *Philosophical Studies* 149 (2010), 153-60.

“Because She Wanted To,” *Journal of Ethics* 14 (2010), 27-35.

“Intentional Omissions,” *Noûs* 44 (2010), 158-77.

• Reprinted in *Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory*

*of Action*, eds. Jesús Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff, 135-55. Cambridge, Mass.:

MIT Press, 2010.

“Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” *Mind* 118

(2009), 323-51.

“Intrinsic Finks,” *Philosophical Quarterly* 58 (2008), 512-18.

“Autonomous Reasons for Intending,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86 (2008),

191-212.

“Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions,” *Philosophical Studies* 133

(2007), 391-409.

“The Appearance of Freedom,” Comment on Jürgen Habermas, “The Language Game of

Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will,” *Philosophical Explorations* 10 (2007), 51-57.

“Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 86 (2005),

408-21.

“On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” *Midwest Studies in*

*Philosophy* 29 (2005), 13-24.

“Reflections on an Argument from Luck,” *Philosophical Topics* 32, Nos. 1 & 2 (2004),

47-64.

“Libertarianism, Action Theory, and the Loci of Responsibility,” *Philosophical Studies*

98 (2000), 153-74.

“Modest Libertarianism,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 14 (2000), 21-45.

“Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More,” *Philosophical Explorations* 2 (1999), 20-41.

“Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental,” *Erkenntnis* 51 (1999),

295-322.

“On the Possibility of Rational Free Action,” *Philosophical Studies* 88 (1997), 37-57.

“Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action,” *Philosophical*

*Topics* 24, No. 2 (1996), 19-48.

• Reprinted in *Free Will*, ed. Derk Pereboom. First edition 1997, 273-300; second

edition 2009, 338-65. Indianapolis: Hackett.

• Reprinted in *Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, vol. III, ed. John

Martin Fischer, 165-94. London: Routledge, 2005.

“Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice,” *Philosophical Quarterly* 46 (1996),

185-201.

“Indeterminism and Control,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1995), 125-38.

“Ability and Responsibility for Omissions,” *Philosophical Studies* 73 (1994), 195-208.

“Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of Desire,” *Pacific*

*Philosophical Quarterly* 75 (1994), 1-11.

“Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” *Noûs* 27 (1993), 191-203.

• Reprinted in *The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the*

*Contemporary Debates*, eds. Paul Russell and Oisin Deery, 215-228. New York:

Oxford University Press, 2013.

• Reprinted in *Great Philosophical Arguments: An Introduction to Philosophy*, ed.

Lewis Vaughn, 409-19. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

• Reprinted in *Free Will*, Second Edition, ed. Gary Watson, 285-98. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2003.

• Reprinted in *Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free*

*Will*, ed. Timothy O’Connor, 201-15. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

“Deliberation and Beliefs about One’s Abilities,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 73

(1992), 101-13.

“Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility,” *Philosophical Studies* 66 (1992),

53-72.

“A Principle of Rational Explanation?” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 30, No. 3 (1992),

1-12.

**Chapters in Books** (in addition to reprinted papers)

“Free Will and Abilities to Act,” in *Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und*

*theologische Perspektiven*, ed. Klaus von Stosch, Saskia Wendel, Martin Breul, and Aaron Langenfeld, 41-62. Paderborn: Schoeningh/Brill, 2019.

“Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions,” in *The Ethics and Law of Omissions*, ed.

Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel C. Rickless, 63-83. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2017.

“Ignorance, Revision, and Commonsense,” in *Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition*,

ed. Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland, 233-51. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2017.

“Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission,” in *Surrounding Free Will*, ed. Alfred R.

Mele, 298-317. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

“Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act,” in *Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary*

*Debates*, ed. David Palmer, 107-23. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

“Reply to Sartorio,” in *Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory*

*of Action*, eds. Jesús Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff, 161-65. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010.

“Making Up One’s Mind,” in *Action, Ethics, and Responsibility*, eds. Joseph Keim

Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry Silverstein, 67-84. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010.

Interview in *Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions*, eds. Jesús Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff,

25-30. New York: Automatic Press/VIP, 2009.

**Articles in Encyclopedias, Handbooks, etc.**

“Negative Agency,” in *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Agency*, ed. Luca

Ferrero. Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming.

“Responsibility for Acts and Omissions,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Moral*

*Responsibility*, eds. Dana Kay Nelkin and Derk Pereboom. New York: Oxford

University Press, forthcoming.

“Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of*

*Philosophy*, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/. First published 2000; revised 2004; revised 2008; revised 2013 (with Justin Capes); revised 2017 (with Justin Capes).

“Libertarianism, Metaphysical,” in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences*,

ed. Byron Kaldis, 556-57. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2013.

“Alternatives for Libertarians,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, 2nd edition, ed.

Robert Kane, 329-48. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

“Freedom and Responsibility,” in *The Routledge Companion to Ethics*, ed. John

Skorupski, 263-74. London: Routledge, 2010.

“Agent Causation,” in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Action*, eds. Timothy

O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, 218-26. Oxford: Blackwell, 2010.

“Freedom of the Will,” in *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind*, eds. Stephen P.

Stich and Ted A. Warfield, 369-404. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

“Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free

Agency,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed. Robert Kane, 356-85. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

**Book Reviews**

Review of Christopher Franklin, *A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of*

*Reduction*, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2018), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/

a-minimal-libertarianism-free-will-and-the-promise-of-reduction/.

“Free Will, Causation, and Absence,” contribution to a symposium on Carolina Sartorio’s

*Causation and Free Will*, *Philosophical Studies* 175 (2018), 1517-24. “Agency and Incompatibilism,” contribution to a symposium on Helen Steward’s *A Metaphysics for Freedom*, *Res Philosophica* 91 (2014), 519-25.

Review of Erasmus Mayr, *Understanding Human Agency*, *Mind* 122 (2013), 575-78.

“Abilities,” contribution to a symposium on Dana Nelkin’s *Making Sense of Freedom*

*and Responsibility*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 86 (2013), 451-

58.

Review of Richard Holton, *Willing, Wanting, Waiting*, *Analysis* 71 (2011), 191-93.

Review of E. J. Lowe, *Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action*,

*Mind* 119 (2010), 820-23.

“Determinism and Our Self-Conception,” contribution to a symposium on John Fischer’s

*My Way*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80 (2010), 242-50.

Review of Alfred R. Mele, *Motivation and Agency*, *Mind* 113 (2004), 565-68.

Review of Alfred R. Mele, *Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy*, *Mind*

110 (2001), 792-96.

Review of Thomas Pink, *The Psychology of Freedom*, *Philosophical Review* 107 (1998),

634-37.

Review of John Martin Fischer, *The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control*,

*Philosophical Review* 106 (1997), 450-53.

Review of R. Jay Wallace, *Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments*, *Philosophy and*

*Phenomenological Research* 57 (1997), 230-32.

“Recent Work on Freedom and Determinism,” *Philosophical Books* 36 (1995), 9-18.

**Video Presentations**

“The Problem of Free Will,” with Stephen Kearns, Philosophy TV,

http://www.philostv.com/randolph-clarke-and-stephen-kearns/

**Conference and Colloquium Presentations**

“Agency, Responsibility, and Demand”

• Workshop on Responsibility and Blame, Wayne State University, April 2019.

“Negative Agency”

• Workshop on Agency, University of Jyväskylä, March 2019.

“Responsibility for Acts and Omissions”

• Tampere University, March 2019.

“Free Will and Abilities to Act”

• Freedom and Determinism Workshop, University of Cologne, October 2018.

• Contribution to a workshop on Kadri Vihvelin’s *Causes, Laws, and Free Will*,

University of Southern California, September 2014.

“Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency”

• Libertarian Agency and Metaphysics: Themes from Clarke, Lund/Gothenburg Responsibility Project, June 2018

• University of Innsbruck, July 2017

“Absence Causation for Causal Dispositionalists”

• American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, January 2018.

“Omissions, Causation, and Absence”

• Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, July 2017

“Free Will, Agent Causation, and ‘Disappearing Agents’”

• Rethinking Free Will, University of Cologne, February 2017

“Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism”

• Gothenburg Responsibility Conference, August 2016.

“Comments on Derk Pereboom’s *Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life*”

• Contribution to book session at American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, April 2016.

“Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions”

• Negligence, Omissions, and Responsibility: Reflecting on Philosophy of Action, Workshop at Birmingham (UK) Law School, March 2016.

• Ethics and Law of Omissions Conference, University of California, San Diego, April 2015.

*Précis* and Replies to Silver and Zimmerman

• Author’s contribution to book session on *Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics,*

*and Responsibility*, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division

Meeting, April 2015.

“Shoemaker on Attributability”

• Contribution to a workshop on David Shoemaker’s manuscript, *Responsibility*

*from the Margins*, Georgia State University, May 2014.

“Agency and Incompatibilism”

• Contribution to a book session on Helen Steward’s *A Metaphysics for Freedom*, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, April 2014.

“Powers, Causes, and Free Will”

• Conference on Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility, Oxford University,

March 2014.

• Society for the Philosophy of Agency, American Philosophical Association

Eastern Division Meeting, December 2013.

• Tennessee Value and Agency Conference, November 2013.

“Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission”

• Big Questions in Free Will Conference, Florida State University, December

2013.

• Conference on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Florida State University,

October 2013.

“Free Will and Agential Powers” (with Thomas Reed)

• New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, November 2013.

• Uppsala University, April 2013.

• Metaphysics of Free Will Workshop, Norwegian University of Life Sciences,

April 2013.

• Workshop on Free Will, University of Calgary, March 2013.

• Workshop on Free Will, Southern Methodist University, February 2013.

• Dispositions and Mind Workshop, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, May 2012.

“Freely Omitting to Act”

• Big Questions in Free Will Conference, Florida State University, January 2013.

• University of Delaware, October 2012.

• North Carolina State University, September 2012.

• Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, August 2012.

• Seoul National University, June 2012.

“Abilities and Asymmetries”

• Contribution to an Author-Meets-Critics session on Dana Nelkin’s *Making*

*Sense of Freedom and Responsibility*, American Philosophical Association

Pacific Division Meeting, April 2012.

“Absence of Action”

• Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2011.

“Moral Responsibility as Appraisability”

• Conference on Moral Responsibility, Ghent University, October 2010.

“Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry”

• The College of William and Mary, March 2010.

“Are We Free to Obey the Laws?”

• Free Will Workshop, Florida State University, January 2010.

“What is an Omission?”

• Annual Meeting of the Ibero-American Philosophical Society, Huatulco,

Mexico, January, 2010.

“Opposing Powers”

• Dispositions Workshop, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea, September

2009.

• American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, March 2009.

“Intrinsic Finks”

• Dispositions Workshop, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea, September

2009.

• Annual Meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association, November 2007.

“Because She Wanted To”

• Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, August 2009.

“Determinism and Our Self-Conception”

• Contribution to an Author-Meets-Critics session on John Fischer’s *My Way*,

American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, March 2008.

“Autonomous Reasons for Intending”

• Washington University in St. Louis, October 2006.

• Florida State University, February 2006.

“Making Up One’s Mind”

• Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, March-April 2006.

Replies to Mele, O’Connor and Churchill, and Pereboom

• Author’s contribution to book session on *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*,

American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, March 2006.

“Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions”

• Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2005.

• Conference on Action and Agency, University of Florida, February 2005.

• University of Georgia, October 2004.

“Prize-Winning Decisions”

• American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting,

March 2005.

“Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck”

• University of Miami, January 2005.

• Conference on Freedom and Responsibility, Hanse Institute for Advanced

Study, Delmenhorst, Germany, March 2004.

“On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”

• Fall Meeting of the Georgia Philosophical Society, November 2003.

“What is Incompatibilism?”

• Wake Forest University, November 2002.

• Society of Christian Philosophers Midwest Division Meeting, Indiana

University, September 2002.

“Substance and Cause”

• Werkmeister Conference on Causation and Free Will, Florida State University,

January 2002.

• University of Georgia, September 2001.

“Two Problems of Control for Libertarianism”

• Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, April 2001.

“Modest Libertarianism”

• University of North Carolina, Greensboro, March 1999.

• Davidson College, March 1999.

• University of Vermont, January 1999.

“Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More”

• Conference on *The Significance of Free Will*, University of

Arkansas, September 1997.

“Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action”

• Auburn University, January 1997.

“Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental”

• University of Georgia, November 1996.

• Virginia Commonwealth University, October 1996.

“A Revised ‘Direct Argument’ for Responsibility-Incompatibilism”

• American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, April 1996.

• Spring Meeting of the Georgia Philosophical Society, May 1995.

“Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice”

• Georgia State University, October 1995.

“On the Possibility of Rational Free Action”

• University of Georgia, May 1995.

“Indeterminism and Control”

• American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, December 1994.

• University of Georgia, November 1993.

“Doing What One Wants Less”

• Fall Meeting of the Georgia Philosophical Society, October 1993.

“Ability and Responsibility for Omissions”

• American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting,

March 1993.

“Omissions, Ability, and Responsibility”

• University of Georgia, March 1993.

“A Principle of Rational Explanation?”

• American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting,

April 1992.

“Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility”

• North Carolina State University, March 1991.

• Wake Forest University, March 1991.

• North Carolina Philosophical Society, February 1991.

“A Libertarian Account of Free Will”

• North Carolina State University, October 1990.

“Originative Freedom”

• Princeton University, December 1989.

**Invited Comments on Convention and Conference Papers**

Comments “The Standard Story of Action and the Problem of Agential Guidance,” by

Jesús Aguilar, Meeting of the American Association of Mexican Philosophers,

March 2019.

Comments on “Moral Ignorance as an Excuse,” by Paulina Sliwa, American

Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, April 2017.

Comments on “Defeating Manipulation Arguments,” by Eddy Nahmias, Bowdoin

Conference on Free Will, October 2011.

Comments on “Classic Compatibilism, Romantic Compatibilism, and the Claims of

Common Sense,” by Kadri Vihvelin, American Philosophical Association Pacific

Division Meeting, April 2010.

Comments on “The Direct Argument: You Say Goodbye, I Say Hello,” by John Martin

Fischer, 2nd Online Philosophy Conference, May 2007.

Comments on “Omissions and Causalism,” by Carolina Sartorio, American Philosophical

Association Pacific Division Meeting, April 2007.

Comments on “Staking a Claim to Libertarianism,” by Dan Speak, New Perspectives on

Free Will and Moral Responsibility, University of San Francisco, November

2006.

Comments on “How to Be Responsible for Something without Causing It,” by Carolina

Sartorio, Syracuse Workshop on Metaphysics, August 2003.

Comments on “Source Incompatibilism and the Nature of Moral Responsibility,” by Derk

Pereboom, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting,

December 2002.

Comments on “The Frequency of Freedom: A Response to Restrictivism,” by Gordon

Pettit, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, April 2000.

Comments on “Challenges for Compatibilism,” by Kenton Machina, American

Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, May 1994.

**Professional Service**

Editorial Committee, *Social Theory and Practice*, 2010-present.

Editorial Board, *Journal of Ethics*, 2018-present.

Journal referee for *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Australasian Journal of*

*Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Canadian Journal of*

*Philosophy*, *Criminal Justice Ethics*, *dialectica*, *Ethics*, *European Journal of*

*Philosophy*, *Inquiry*, *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, *Journal*

*of Consciousness Studies*, *Journal of Ethics*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Policy*,

*Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*,

*Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Philosophia, Philosophical Explorations*, *Philosophical*

*Papers*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*,

*Philosophy Compass*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Res*

*Philosophica*, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, *Social Philosophy & Policy*,

*Social Theory and Practice*, *Synthese*, *Ratio*, *Theoria*.

Referee of book proposals for Oxford University Press.

Reviewer of fellowship & grant proposals for: Central European University, Florida State

University COFRS, Israel Science Foundation, John Templeton Foundation,

National Endowment for the Humanities, National Humanities Center, National

Science Center of Poland, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of

Canada.

Referee of conference submissions for American Philosophical Association, Florida

Philosophical Association, New Orleans Workshop on Agency and

Responsibility, Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Society for Philosophy &

Psychology.

External tenure & promotion review for faculty at Cornell University, Davidson College,

Drexel University, Loyola Marymount University, University of Arizona,

University of Massachusetts.

Opponent, Dissertation Defense, University of Jyväskylä.