Al Mele Full Publication List

 

Books

Author:

Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will. Oxford University Press, 2017.

Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will. Oxford University Press, 2014.

A Dialogue on Free Will and Science. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford University Press, 2009 (awarded American Philosophical Association’s 2013 Sanders Book Prize).

Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press, 2006.

Motivation and Agency. Oxford University Press, 2003.

Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press, 1995.

Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Oxford University Press, 1992.

Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press, 1987.

Editor:

A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Self-Control. Oxford University Press, 2020.

A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press, 2015.

R. Baumeister, A. Mele, and K. Vohs, eds. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press, 2010.

M. Timmons, J. Greco, and A. Mele, eds. Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press, 2007.

A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2004.

A. Mele, ed. The Philosophy of Action (Oxford Readings in Philosophy series). Oxford University Press, 1997.

J. Heil and A. Mele, eds. Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

 

Articles

“Deciding: How Special Is It?” Philosophical Explorations (forthcoming).

“Autonomy and Beliefs,” in J. Childress and M. Quante, eds. Thick (Concepts of) Autonomy, Springer (forthcoming).

R. Vekony, A. Mele, and D. Rose, “Intentional Action Without Knowledge,” Synthese (forthcoming).

“Weakness of Will,” in M. Vargas and J. Doris, eds. Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

“Moral Responsibility and Neuroscience,” in D. Nelkin and D. Pereboom, eds. Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (forthcoming).

“Free Will: Looking Ahead,” in J. Campbell, ed. A Companion to Free Will. Blackwell (forthcoming).

“Mental Causation, Moral Responsibility, and Effective Intentions,” in H. J. Stam, ed. The Sage Handbook of Theoretical Psychology. Sage (forthcoming).

“Direct Versus Indirect: Control, Moral Responsibility, and Free Action,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2021): 559-573.

Manipulated Agents: Précis,” Criminal Law and Philosophy (2021) 15: 249-253.

Manipulated Agents: Replies to Fischer, Haji, and McKenna,” Criminal Law and Philosophy (2021) 15: 299-309.

A. Mele, T. Nadelhoffer, and M. Khoudary, “Folk Psychology and Proximal Intentions,” Philosophical Psychology (2021) 34: 761-783.

“Self-Deception and Selectivity,” Philosophical Studies (2020) 177: 2697-2711.

“Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism,” Monist (2020) 103: 262-277.

“Moral Responsibility and Manipulation: On a Novel Argument Against Historicism,” Philosophical Studies (2020): 177: 3143-3154.

“Introduction,” in A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Self-Control. Oxford University Press, 2020, 1-14.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Decision Times and the Point of No Return,” in B. Feltz, M. Missal, and A. Sims, eds. Free Will, Causality and Neuroscience. Brill, 2020, 83-96.

“On Snubbing Proximal Intentions,” Philosophical Studies (2019) 176: 2833-2853.

“Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy (2019) 43: 75-92.

M. Brass, A. Furstenberg, and A. Mele, “Why Neuroscience Does Not Disprove Free Will,” Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews (2019) 102: 251-263.

“Freedom,” in G. Oppy, ed. Blackwell Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Blackwell, 2019, 237-249.

“Causalism: On Action Explanation and Causal Deviance,” in G. Schumann, ed. Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches. Routledge, 2019, 45-58.

“Weakness of Will and Davidson’s Paradox of Irrationality: A Response to Zheng,” Dao (2019) 18: 597-602.

“Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism,” Frontiers in Psychology, 11 December 2018, 1-8. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02536/full

“Exercising Self-Control: An Apparent Problem Resolved,” in J. Bermúdez, ed. Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality. Cambridge University Press, 2018, 204-217.

“Diana and Ernie Return: On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will,” Philosophical Studies (2018) 175: 1525-1533.

“Free Will and Consciousness,” in D. Jacquette, ed. Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness. Bloomsbury, 2018, 371-388.

A. Vonasch, R. Baumeister, and A. Mele. “Ordinary People Think Free Will Is a Lack of Constraint, Not the Presence of a Soul.” Consciousness and Cognition (2018) 60: 133-151.

“On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument,” Criminal Law and Philosophy (2017) 11: 561-574.

“Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane’s View,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement (2017) 80: 49-68.

“Direct Control,” Philosophical Studies (2017) 174: 275-290.

“Character in Action,” in I. Fileva, ed. Questions of Character. Oxford University Press, 2017, 169-181.

“Moral Responsibility: Radical Reversals and Original Designs,” Journal of Ethics (2016) 20: 69-82.

“Libet and the Timing of the Will,” in J. Clausen and N. Levy, eds. Handbook of Neuroethics, Springer (2016 online), 1-16. DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6285-5_170-1

“Luck, Control, and Free Will: Answering Berofsky,” Journal of Philosophy (2015) 112: 337-355.

“Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?” Philosophical Explorations (2015) 18: 297-309.

“Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck,” Journal of Ethics (2015) 19: 1-21.

“Introduction,” in A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press (2015), 1-3.

P. Haggard, A. Mele, T. O’Connor, and K. Vohs, “Free Will Lexicon,” in A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press (2015), 319-326.

“Luck and Free Will,” Metaphilosophy (2014) 45: 543-557. Reprinted in D. Pritchard and L. Whittington, eds. The Philosophy of Luck. Wiley Blackwell (2015), 93-106.

“Kane, Luck, and Control,” in D. Palmer, ed. Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press (2014), 37-51.

“Self-Control, Motivational Strength, and Exposure Therapy,” Philosophical Studies (2014) 170: 359-375.

S. Kearns and A. Mele, “Have Compatibilists Solved the Luck Problem for Libertarians?” Philosophical Inquiries (2014) 2: 9-36.

“The Single Phenomenon View and Experimental Philosophy,” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe, eds. Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Oxford University Press (2014), 38-55.

“Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press (2014), 195-207.

“Reply to Nadelhoffer and Vargas,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press (2014), 227-233.

“Libertarianism and Human Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2013): 72-92.

“Is What You Decide Ever up to You?” in I. Haji and J. Caouette, eds. Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2013), 74-97.

“Unconscious Decisions and Free Will,” Philosophical Psychology 26 (2013): 777-789.

“Actions, Explanations, and Causes,” in G. D’Oro and C. Sandis, eds. Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, Palgrave Macmillan (2013), 160-174.

Free Will and Neuroscience,” Philosophic Exchange 43 (2013): 1-17.

“Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting,” Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 167-184.

“Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Minutelings,” Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 153-166.

A. Mele and J. Shepherd, “Situationism and Agency,” Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (2013): 62-83.

“Free Will, Science, and Punishment,” in T. Nadelhoffer, ed. The Future of Punishment, Oxford University Press (2013), 177-191.

“Vetoing and Consciousness,” in A. Clark, J. Kiverstein, and T. Vierkant eds. Decomposing the Will, Oxford University Press (2013), 73-86.

“Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem,” Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 237-255.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet’s Studies,” in A. Suarez and P. Adams, eds. Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer (2013), 195-207.

“Consciousness in Action: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Data, and Inferences,” in J. Larrazabal, ed. Cognition, Reasoning, Emotion, and Action. University of the Basque Country Press (2012), 87-98.

“Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action,” Philosophical Issues 22 (2012): 281-297.

“Intentional, Unintentional, or Neither? Middle Ground in Theory and Practice,” American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2012): 369-379.

“Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2012): 387-398.

“Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Monist 95 (2012): 422-440.

“Autonomy and Neuroscience,” in L. Radoilska, ed. Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press (2012), 26-43.

“When Are We Self-Deceived?” Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2012): 1–15.

“Autonomie, moralische Verantwortung und das Fortsetzungsproblem” (“Autonomy, Moral Responsibility, and the Continuation Problem”), in J. Nida-Rümelin and E. Özmen, eds. Welt der Gründe. Felix Meiner Verlag (2012), 156-178.

“Moral Psychology,” in C. Miller, ed. The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum (2011), 98-118.

“Free Will and Science,” in R. Kane, ed. Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press (2011), 499-514. Reprinted in J. Dancy and C. Sandis, eds. Philosophy of Action: An Anthology (Wiley Blackwell, 2015).

T. Stillman, R. Baumeister, and A. Mele, “Free Will in Everyday Life: Autobiographical Accounts of Free and Unfree Actions,” Philosophical Psychology 24 (2011): 381-394.

“Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and L. Nadel, eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 23-33.

“Self-Control in Action,” in S. Gallagher, ed. Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 465-486.

“Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist,” Neuroethics 4: (2011): 25-29.

“Weakness of Will and Akrasia,” Philosophical Studies 150 (2010): 391-404.

“Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions,” Philosophical Explorations 13 (2010): 101-111.

“Testing Free Will,” Neuroethics 3 (2010): 161-172.

“Teleological Explanations of Actions: Anticausalism vs. Causalism,” in J. Aguilar and A. Buckareff, eds. Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. MIT Press (2010), pp. 183-198.

“Scientific Skepticism about Free Will,” in T. Nadelhoffer, E. Nahmias, and S. Nichols, eds. Moral Psychology: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Blackwell (2010), pp. 295-305.

“Approaching Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company.” Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010): 745-750.

“Conscious Deciding and the Science of Free Will,” in R. Baumeister, A. Mele, and K. Vohs, eds. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press (2010), pp. 43-65.

A. Mele, K. Vohs, and R. Baumeister, “Free Will and Consciousness: An Introduction and Overview of Perspectives,” in R. Baumeister, A. Mele, and K. Vohs, eds. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press (2010), pp. 1-7.

“Conscious Intentions,” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and H. Silverstein, eds. Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press (2010), pp. 85-107.

“Motivational Strength,” in T. O’Connor and C. Sandis, eds. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell (2010), pp. 259-266.

“Causation, Action, and Free Will,” in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies, eds. Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 554-574.

“Moral Responsibility and History Revisited,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2009) 12: 463-475.

“Delusional Confabulations and Self-Deception,” in W. Hirstein, ed. Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 139-157.

“Mental Action: A Case Study,” in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou, eds. Mental Actions and Agency. Oxford: Clarendon Press (2009), pp. 17-37.

“Moral Responsibility and Agents’ Histories,” Philosophical Studies (2009) 142: 161-181.

“Intention and Intentional Action,” in B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, and S. Walter, eds. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 691-710.

“Have I Unmasked Self-Deception or Am I Self-Deceived?” in C. Martin, ed. The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 260-276.

“Action and Mind,” in J. Symons and P. Calvo, eds. Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge (2009), pp. 609-620.

“Recent Work on Free Will and Science,” American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2008): 107-129.

“Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing,” Philosophical Psychology 21 (2008): 1-14.

“Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics (2008) 12: 263-286.

“Psychology and Free Will: a Commentary,” in J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman, and R. Baumeister, eds. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press (2008), pp. 325-346.

“A Libertarian View of Akratic Action,” Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 49 (2008): 252-275.

F. Cushman and A. Mele, “Intentional Action: Two-and-a-half Folk Concepts,” in J. Knobe and S. Nichols, eds. Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2008), pp. 171-188.

“Persisting Intentions,” Noûs 41 (2007): 735-757.

A. Mele and F. Cushman, “Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007): 184-201.

Free Will and Luck: Précis,” Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 153-155.

Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics,” Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 195-210.

“Reasonology and False Beliefs,” Philosophical Papers 36 (2007): 91-118.

“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, eds. Explanation and Causation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy. MIT Press (2007), pp. 241-263.

“Self-Deception and Three Psychiatric Delusions: On Robert Audi’s Transition from Self-Deception to Delusion,” in M. Timmons, J. Greco, and A. Mele, eds. Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press (2007), pp. 163-175.

“Self-Deception and Hypothesis Testing,” in M. Marraffa, M. De Caro, and F. Feretti eds. Cartographies of the Mind. Kluwer (2007): 159-167.

“Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-style Cases Revisited,” in F. Castellani and J. Quitterer, eds. Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis Verlag (2007): 125-140.

“Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience,” in C. Lumer and S. Nannini, eds. Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate (2007): 257-272.

“Practical Mistakes and Intentional Actions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006): 249-260.

“Free Will: Theories, Analysis, and Data,” in S. Pockett, W. Banks, and S. Gallagher, eds. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition (MIT Press, 2006), 187-205.

“Self-Deception and Delusions,” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2006): 109-124. Also in T. Bayne and J. Fernandez, eds. Delusion and Self-Deception (Psychology Press, 2009), 55-69.

“Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics 10 (2006): 283-294.

“The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: A Commentary,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (2006): 277-290.

“Action,” in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds. Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2005), 334-357.

Motivation and Agency: Reply to Davis, Ginet, and Roth,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 295-311.

Motivation and Agency: Précis,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 243-247.

“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 395-421.

“Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (2005): 146-162.

“A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ for Incompatibilism,” Analysis (2005) 65: 75-80.

“Dennett on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2005): 36: 414-426.

“Agnostic Autonomism Revisited,” in J. Taylor, ed. Personal Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 109-23.

J. Gert and A. Mele, “Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration.” Philosophia 32 (2005): 275-283.

“Acção humana par excellence” (“Human Agency Par Excellence”), in F. Mão de Ferro, ed. A explicação da interpretação humana (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2005).

“The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions,” Philosophical Topics 32 (2004): 193-213.

“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” in J. Hyman and H. Steward eds. Agency and Action (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 217-241.

“Velleman on Action and Agency,” Philosophical Studies (2004) 121: 249-261.

“Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control,” in P. Baumann and M. Betzler, eds. Practical Conflicts (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 262-278.

“Action: Volitional Disorder and Addiction,” in J. Radden, ed. The Philosophy of Psychiatry (Oxford University Press, 2004), 78-88.

“Motivated Irrationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004), 240-256.

A. Mele and P. Rawling, “Introduction: Aspects of Rationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004), 3-13.

“Agents’ Abilities,” Noûs (2003) 37: 447-470.

“Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses,” Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 325-340.

“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” in A. Hatzimoysis, ed. Philosophy and the Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 163-179.

“Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom,” in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003), 251-264.

“Chisholm on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2003) 34: 630-648.

“Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade,” in M. Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, and K. Miller, eds., Realism in Action (Kluwer, 2003), 129-135.

“Philosophy of Action,” in K. Ludwig, ed. Donald Davidson (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64-84.

A. Mele and D. Robb, “BBs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003), 127-138. Reprinted in J. Fischer, ed. Free Will (Routledge, 2005).

“Akratics and Addicts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002): 153-167.

“Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will,” in R. Kane, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free-Will (Oxford University Press, 2002), 529-548.

“Autonomy and Akrasia,” Philosophical Explorations 3 (2002): 207-216.

“Reply to Commentators,” Florida Philosophical Review 2 (2002): 98-101.

H. Beebee and A. Mele, “Humean Compatibilism.” Mind 111 (2002): 201-223. Reprinted in J. Fischer, ed. Free Will (Routledge, 2005).

“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” in B. Malle, L. Moses, and D. Baldwin, eds. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (MIT Press, 2001), 27-43.

“Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations, Causal Theories, and Deviance,” Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 279-300.

“Deciding to Act,” Philosophical Studies 100 (2000): 81-108.

“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2000): 115-137.

“Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 447-452.

“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in M. Betzler and B. Guckes, eds., Autonomes Handeln (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), 25-37.

“Twisted Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology 12 (1999): 117-137.

“Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck,” Social Philosophy & Policy 16 (1999): 274-293. Reprinted in E. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul, eds. Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

“Motivation, Self-Control, and the Agglomeration of Desires,” Facta Philosophica 1 (1999): 77-86.

“Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will,” Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999): 96-104.

“Is There a Place for Intention in an Analysis of Intentional Action?” Philosophia 27 (1999): 419-432.

“Autoinganno e Controllo Delle Ipotesi” (Self-Deception and Hypothesis Testing; translated by Massimo Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti 11 (1999): 503-519.

“L’autoinganno Deflazionato: Risposte a Bermudez e Graham” (Deflated Self-Deception: Reply to Bermudez and Graham; translated by Massimo Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti 11 (1999): 541-545.

“Motivational Strength,” Noûs 32 (1998): 23-36.

“Noninstrumental Rationalizing,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998): 236-250.

“Motivated Belief and Agency,” Philosophical Psychology 11 (1998): 353-369.

“Synchronic Self-Control Revisited: Frog and Toad Shape Up,” Analysis 58 (1998): 305-310.

“Flickers of Freedom,” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1998): 144-156.

“Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception,” in J. Dupuy, ed., Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1998), 37-58.

“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 9-37.

“Probing Akrasia: Reply to Ricardo Santos,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 45-49.

A. Mele and D. Robb, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.” Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 97-112. Reprinted in L. Ekstrom, ed. Agency and Responsibility (Boulder: Westview, 2001) and in J. Fischer, ed. Free Will (Routledge, 2005).

“Real Self-Deception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 91-102.

“Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception” (response to commentaries), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 127-134.

“Strength of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from Libet,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 319-332.

“Agency and Mental Action,” Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 231-249.

“Passive Action,” in G. Holmström-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, eds., Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 135-143.

“Underestimating Self-Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad,” Analysis 57 (1997): 119-123.

“Introduction,” in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford University Press, 1997), 1-26.

P. Livingston and A. Mele, “Evaluating Emotional Responses to Fiction,” in M. Hjort and S. Laver, eds., Emotion and the Arts (Oxford University Press, 1997), 157-176.

“Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness,” Ethics 106 (1996): 727-753.

“Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios,” Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 123-141.

“Socratic Akratic Action,” Philosophical Papers 25 (1996): 149-159.

“Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle,” Proto Sociology 8/9 (1996): 39-52. Reprinted in G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds. The Contextualization of Rationality (Mentis: Paderborn, 2000).

“Addiction and Self-Control,” Behavior and Philosophy 24 (1996): 99-117.

“Motivation and Intention,” Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (1996): 51-67.

A. Mele and S. Sverdlik, “Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies (1996) 82: 265-287.

“Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 387-423.

“Effective Deliberation About What to Intend: Or Striking it Rich in a Toxin-Free Environment,” Philosophical Studies 79 (1995): 85-93.

“Conceptualizing Self-Control,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1995): 136-137.

“Self-Control and Belief,” Philosophical Psychology 7 (1994): 419-435.

“Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1994): 627-636.

A. Mele and P. Moser, “Intentional Action.” Noûs 28 (1994): 39-68. Reprinted in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford University Press, 1997).

“Justifying Intentions,” Mind 102 (1993): 335-337.

“History and Personal Autonomy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1993): 271-280.

“Motivated Belief,” Behavior and Philosophy 21 (1993): 19-27.

“Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 61.

Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires,” Noûs 26 (1992): 281-302.

“Intending for Reasons,” Mind 101 (1992): 327-333.

“Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle,” Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 171-194.

“Recent Work on Intentional Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1992): 199-217.

“Acting for Reasons and Acting Intentionally,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1992): 355-374.

F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Intention/Volition Debate.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 323-338.

A. Mele and P. Livingston, “Intentions and Interpretations.” MLN 107 (1992): 931-949.

P. Livingston and A. Mele, “Intention and Literature.” Stanford French Review 16 (1992): 173-196.

“He Wants to Try Again: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 51 (1991): 225-228.

“Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 33-47.

“Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991): 197-212.

“Dretske’s Intricate Behavior,” Philosophical Papers 20 (1991): 1-10.

“Motivational Ties,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991): 431-442.

J. Heil and A. Mele, “Mental Causes,” American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 49-59.

“Irresistible Desires,” Noûs 24 (1990): 455-472.

“Exciting Intentions,” Philosophical Studies 59 (1990): 289-312.

“He Wants to Try,” Analysis 50 (1990): 251-253.

“Intending and Motivation: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 50 (1990): 194-197.

“Errant Self-Control and the Self-Controlled Person,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1990): 47-59.

“Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 19-30.

“She Intends to Try,” Philosophical Studies 55 (1989): 101-106.

“Intentions by Default,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 155-166.

“Akratic Feelings,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989): 277-288.

“Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning,” Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-436. Reprinted in R. J. Wallace, ed. Reason, Emotion, and Will (Ashgate, 1999).

F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1989): 511-531.

“Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1988): 723-731.

“Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention,” Philosophia 18 (1988): 239-242.

“Self-Deception and Akratic Belief: A Rejoinder,” Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 203-208.

Irrationality: A Précis,” Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 173-177.

A. Mele and M. Smith, “The New Paradox of the Stone.” Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 283-290.

“Recent Work on Self-Deception,” American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 1-17.

“Are Intentions Self-Referential?” Philosophical Studies 52 (1987): 309-329.

“Intentional Action and Wayward Causal Chains: The Problem of Tertiary Waywardness,” Philosophical Studies 51 (1987): 55-60.

“Incontinent Believing,” Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 212-222. Reprinted in L. Stevenson et al., eds., Mind, Causation, and Action (Basil Blackwell, 1986), 102-112.

“Is Akratic Action Unfree?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1986): 673-679.

(Review article) “Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Review of David Pears’s Motivated Irrationality,” Behaviorism 14 (1986): 183-191.

“Self-Control, Action, and Belief,” American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 169-175.

“Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology of Action,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985): 375-393. Reprinted in N. Sherman, ed. Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

“How to Represent Aristotelian Deliberation Syllogistically,” The New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 484-492.

“Aristotle on the Roles of Reason in Motivation and Justification,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (1984): 124-147.

“Aristotle’s Wish,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 139-156.

“Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. X (1984): 133-155.

“Intending and the Balance of Motivation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1984): 370-376.

“Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions,” Philosophia 14 (1984): 145-152.

Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes,” Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 345-368.

“Self-Deception,” Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1983): 365-377.

“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56 (1982): 79-86.

“Self-Deception, Action, and Will: Comments,” Erkenntnis 18 (1982): 159-164.

“Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 405-423.

“The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of Action,” The New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 281-316.

“Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman 58 (1981): 137-157.

“On ‘Happiness and the Good Life’,” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 (1979): 181-187.

 

Encyclopedia and Dictionary Entries, etc.

Alfred Mele, Do we have Free Will? Indian Genes, July 2021. 

“Free Will” Through the Lenses of Philosophy and Neuroscience with Dr Alfred Mele, Bridging the Gaps podcast, July, 2021 

“How can we determine whether or not we have free will?” in U. Maoz and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, eds. Free Will: Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Using Our Free Will to Become More Resilient: An interview with Alfred Mele on how free will can help us and others.Psychology Today, Feb. 8, 2021

The Problem of Luck with Alfred Mele. Podcast. The Free Will Show. September, 2020.

“Action Theory,” Encyclopedia Americana (forthcoming).

“Is Free Will Dead (Again)?” The Philosophers’ Magazine (2018) 83: 80-86.

Dan Schneider Video Interview #208: On Free Will: Scientific Philosopher Alfred Mele, July, 2017. 

Fuelling Free Will,” radio interview, The Philosopher’s Zone, Australian Broadcasting Company, aired February, 2017. 

Do Neuroscience and Quantum Physics Disprove the Existence of Free Will?” Podcast, “The Science of Success,” February, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” MOOC recording, University of Edinburgh, July, 2016.

Interview for What Is it like to be a Philosopher. Summer, 2015.

Radio interview on Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will. The Dennis Prager Show, June 2, 2015.

Interview on free will and related matters. GVSU radio, The Hauenstein Center American Conversations Series, January, 22, 2015.

http://www.wgvu.org/wgvunews/audio/fplayer1.cfm?StartRecord=21&styid=30195&as=no

Interview (Patrick Haggard, Alfred Mele, Kathleen Vohs). BBC Radio, “Neuroscientist Paul Broks on Free Will and the Brain,” November, 2014. 

“Free Will: A Modest Proposal,” Slate, October, 2014. http://www.slate.com/bigideas/are-we-free/essays-and-opinions/alfred-mele-opinion

Interviews with Interesting People, Fall, 2014.

http://www.interviewswithinterestingpeople.com/dr-alfred-mele-philosophy-professor/

Free Will and Science; discussion with Eddy Nahmias; Philosophy TV (Summer 2014) 

Discussion Summary: What Are the Implications of the Free Will Debate for Individuals and Society.” Big Questions Online. June, 2014.

“What Are the Implications of the Free Will Debate for Individuals and Society?” Big Questions Online. May, 2014. https://www.bigquestionsonline.com/content/what-are-implications-free-will-debate-individuals-and-society

Kitty Genovese and the Bystander Effect: 50 years on.” OUPblog, March, 2014.

Interview on Philosophy of Action, in C. Mauro, S. Miguens, and S. Cadilha, eds. Conversations on Human Action and Practical Rationality. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, 29-49.

Interview on Free Will, Methode 2 (2013): 112-116.

“Agency,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, in B. Kaldis, ed. Sage, 2013, 11-14.

“Free Will,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics, H. LaFolette, ed. Blackwell, 2013, 2027-37.

“Author Q & A: Alfred Mele Explains How We Act Against Our Better Judgements,” The Philosophers’ Magazine (2013, 1st Quarter) 60: 125-26.

“Backsliding” podcast, June, 2012:

http://iprocrastinate.libsyn.com/webpage/backsliding-and-weakness-of-will

The Case Against the Case Against Free Will.The Chronicle of Higher Education, The Chronicle Review, 3-18-2012. 

Interview with 3:AM Magazine. February, 2012.

Reprinted in R. Marshall, Philosophy at 3:AM, Oxford University Press, 2014, 136-146.

“Premium, Mid-Grade and Regular Free Will Fuel Accountability,” Phi Kappa Phi Forum 92.1 2012, 11-12.

“Chance, Choice, and Freedom,” The Philosophers’ Magazine (2011, 4th quarter) 55: 61-65.

Who Makes Our Decisions? Taking Aim at Free Will,” podcast with John-Dylan Haynes.  Nature, 9-1-2011. Kerri Smith, interviewer.  

Chats with Remarkable People Series with Alfred Mele,” Mind, Brain & Body; 6-3-11

Self-Deception,Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig, ed. Routledge, 2010. 

“Free Will,” The Philosophers’ Magazine 50 (2010, 3rd quarter), 86-87.

“Decision/Action, Philosophical Issues About,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science (2010), vol. 1, issue 2, pp. 184-90.

Does Moral Action Depend on Reasoning? Only If We're Free.” 2010. 

“The Puzzle of Free Will.” Voice of America Health and Wellness (Internet Talk Radio); 9-17-10.  http://www.voiceamerica.com/voiceamerica/vepisode.aspx?aid=48665

Big Think Interview with Alfred Mele. March, 2010. 

“Freedom of Will,” Encyclopedia of Neuroscience, M. Binder, N. Hirokawa, and U. Windhorst, eds. (Springer, 2009), 1631-34.

“Free Will,” Encyclopedia of Consciousness, W. Banks, ed. (Elsevier, 2009), vol. 1, 265-277.

“Interview,” Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions, J. Aguilar and A. Buckareff, eds. (VIP/Automatic Press, 2009), pp. 183-194.

“Action,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. (Macmillan, 2006) vol. 1, 14-22.

“Intention,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. (Macmillan, 2006) vol. 4, 700-704. Reprinted in T. O’Connor and C. Sandis, eds. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell (2010), 108-113.

“Weakness of the Will,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. (Macmillan, 2006) vol. 9, 728-32.

“Agent Causation” (18); “Belief and Desire” (85-86); “Counterexample, Philosophy By” (181); “Moral Motivation” (622); “Practical Syllogism” (747), and entries from first edition, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Clarendon Press, 2005), T. Honderich, ed.

“Rational Irrationality,” The Philosophers’ Magazine 26 (2004, 2nd quarter), 31-32.

“Bad News for Free Will,” New Humanist, Jan., 2004, 24-25.

“Action, Philosophical Issues About,” Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Nature Publishing Group, 2003), vol. 1, 20-23, L. Nadel, ed.

“Free Will and Determinism,” in L. McHenry and T. Yagisawa, eds. Reflections on Philosophy, 2nd. ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 57-79.

“Agnostic Autonomism.” 2002. At Ted Honderich, ed. The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/%7Euctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm.

“Self-Control” (1548-51) and “Temperance” (1693-96; update of 1992 entry), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), L. Becker and C. Becker, eds.

“Accidie” (6), “Control” (184), “Motivation” (591-92), “Socratic Paradoxes” (861), and “Toxin Puzzle” (924-25), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1999), R. Audi, ed.

“Self-Deception,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 1998), vol. 8, 626-629, E. Craig, ed.

“The Philosophy of Action: An Interview with Alfred R. Mele,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 53-84.

“Intentionality,” Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 339-340, P. Werhane and R. Freeman, eds.

“Reply to Lee Overton and Michael Smith,” Brown Electronic Article Review Service, J. Dreier and D. Estlund, eds. World Wide Web (www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/ homepage.html), posted May 13, 1997.

“Action Theory,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 3-4, D. Borchert, ed.

“Basic Action,” A Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 44-46, J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds.

“Acts, Mental” (6), “Attitude” (64), “Deviance, Causal” (197), “Parallelism, Psychophysical” (645), “Ratiocination” (741), “Self-Control” (818), Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Clarendon Press, 1995), T. Honderich, ed.

Akrasia” (14-15), “Extrinsic Desire” (259), “Rationalization” (675), “Theoretical Reason” (796), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1995), R. Audi, ed.

“Philosophy, a Bus Ride, and Dumb Luck,” in R. Karnos and D. Shoemaker, eds., Falling in Love with Wisdom (Oxford University Press, 1993).

“Temperance,” Encyclopedia of Ethics (Garland, 1992), 1238-41; L. Becker and C. Becker, eds.

 

Reviews

“Responsibility Without Free Will?” Review of M. Gazzaniga, Who’s in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain (HarperCollins, 2011), BioScience 62 (2012): 313-14.

J. Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology (Columbia University Press, 2007), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2007; http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9145).

R. Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2003), Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 142-144.

J. Adler, Belief’s Own Ethics (MIT Press, 2002), Ethics 114 (2003), 156-158.

S. Buss and L. Overton, eds. Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (MIT Press, 2002), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 292-295.

D. Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Mind 112 (2003): 375-78.

J. Searle, Rationality in Action (MIT Press, 2001), Mind 111 (2002): 905-909.

R. Audi, The Architecture of Reason (Oxford University Press, 2001), The Times Literary Supplement, Aug. 9, 2002: 24.

M. Bratman, Faces of Intention (Cambridge University Press, 1999), Ethics 111 (2001): 400-403.

A. Barnes, Seeing Through Self-Deception (Cambridge University Press, 1997), Philosophical Psychology 12 (1999): 104-107.

P. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (University of Chicago Press, 1997), Philosophical Books 40 (1999): 49-51.

B. Berofsky, Liberation from Self (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 995-996.

R. Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 1996), Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 581-584.

T. Pink, The Psychology of Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Mind 107 (1998): 242-246.

K. Lehrer, Self-Trust (Clarendon Press, 1997) and B. Berofsky, Liberation from Self (Cambridge University Press, 1995), The Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 9, 1998: 29.

G. Schueler, Desire (MIT Press, 1995), Minds and Machines 6 (1996): 253-56.

W. Child, Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind (Clarendon Press, 1994), Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 637-39.

“Teleological Behaviorism: A Review of Howard Rachlin’s Behavior and Mind: The Roots of Modern Psychology” (Oxford University Press, 1994), Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1995): 71-73.

R. Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason (Cornell University Press, 1993), Mind 104 (1995): 145-48.

R. Dasenbrock, ed. Literary Theory After Davidson (Penn State University Press, 1993), Philosophy and Literature 18 (1994): 165-67.

J. Segal, Agency and Alienation (Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), Ethics 10 (1993): 410.

R. Dunn, The Possibility of Weakness of Will (Hackett, 1987), Noûs 27 (1993): 384-85.

C. Ginet, On Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 488-91.

D. Walton, Practical Reasoning (Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), Mind 100 (1991): 417-18.

T. Honderich, A Theory of Determinism (Clarendon Press, 1988), Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1990): 85-87.

J. Marks, ed., The Ways of Desire (Precedent, 1986), Noûs 24 (1990): 611-13.

R. DeSousa, The Rationality of Emotion (MIT Press, 1987), Philosophical Books 30 (1989): 39-40.

M. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, 1987), Mind 97 (1988): 632-34.

R. Gordon, The Structure of Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Philosophical Books 29 (1988): 224-25.

D. Walton, Courage: A Philosophical Investigation (University of California Press, 1986), Philosophy of Religion 23 (1988): 117-18.

D. Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (Cornell University Press, 1984), Noûs 20 (1986): 562-65.

B. Hubbard and E. Karnofsky, Plato’s Protagoras (University of Chicago Press, 1982), Noûs 20 (1986): 269-71.

T. Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Insight (Clarendon Press, 1983), Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 273-75.

D. O’Meara, ed., Studies in Aristotle (Catholic University of America Press, 1981), The Thomist 48 (1984): 318-22.

M. Simon, Understanding Human Action: Social Explanation of the Vision of Social Science (SUNY Press, 1981), The Thomist 48 (1984): 121-25.

 

Presentations: American Philosophical Association

“Intentions, Decisions, and Neuroscience,” APA– Central Division (via Zoom); February, 2021.

Mele Melee: Al-Mele-Meets-Critics Sartorio, Bjornsson (Lost Pacific APA 2020). Pea Soup, May 2020. http://peasoup.us/2020/05/mele-melee-al-mele-meets-critics-sartorio-bjornsson-robbins-lost-pacific-apa-2020/

Critic in author-meets-critics session on Christian List’s Why Free Will Is Real; APA–Eastern Division; Philadelphia; January, 2020. (Randy Clarke read my contribution in my absence.)

“Weakness of Will,” APA–Pacific Division; Vancouver; April, 2019.

“Agency, Akrasia, and the Normative Environment: Comments,” APA–Central Division; Denver; February, 2019.

Commentary on Y. Zheng’s “Weakness of Will and Davidson’s Paradox of Irrationality,” APA–Eastern Division; New York City, January, 2019.

Commentary on R. Altshuler’s “Actions and Narrative Sentences,” APA–Eastern Division; New York City, January, 2019.

Response to E. J. Coffman and Meghan Griffith, book symposium on my Aspects of Agency (Oxford University Press, 2017), APA–Eastern Division; Savannah, January, 2018.

“Self-Control: A Puzzle,” APA–Central Division; Chicago; March, 2016.

Commentary on Y. Cohen’s “A Grounding Solution to the Davidsonian Challenge,” APA–Pacific Division; Vancouver; April, 2015.

Commentary on G. D’Oro’s “On an Imaginary but Not So Imaginary Dialogue Between a Causalist and an Anti-causalist,” APA–Pacific Division; San Diego; April, 2014.

Commentary on C. Sartorio’s “What Difference Does It Make? On Acting Freely and Making a Difference,” APA–Central Division; Chicago; February, 2014.

“Self-Deception and Delusions,” APA–Pacific Division; San Francisco; March, 2013.

Commentary on G. Löhrer and S. Sehon, “The Davidsonian Challenge to the Non-Causalist,” Society for Philosophy of Agency, APA–Pacific Division; San Francisco; March, 2013.

“Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?” APA–Pacific Division; Seattle; April, 2012.

Society for Philosophy of Agency.  Panelist, the Current State and Future of Philosophical Research on Action and Agency.  APA–Pacific Division; Seattle; April, 2012.

“Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Luck: Comments on Papers by Franklin and Tognazzini,” APA–Pacific Division; San Diego; April, 2011.

“Effective Intentions: Reply to Balaguer and Kane,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on my Effective Intentions (Oxford University Press, 2009); APA–Central Division; Minneapolis; April, 2011.

“Comments on Classical Compatibilism,” APA–Pacific Division; San Francisco; April, 2010.

“Stich on Experimental Philosophy” (commentary); APA–Eastern Division; New York City, December, 2009.

“Free Will and Science: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness,” APA–Central Division; Chicago; February, 2009.

Free Will and Luck: Reply to Three Critics,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on my Free Will and Luck (Oxford University Press, 2006); APA–Pacific Division; San Francisco; April, 2007.

“Enç on Action: Deviant Causal Chains, Disappearing Agents, and Induced Intentions,” APA–Central Division; Chicago; April, 2006.

“Agent Causation and Luck: A Problem for Clarke,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on Randolph Clarke’s Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2003), APA–Pacific Division; Portland; March, 2006.

“Reply to Critics,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on my Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton University Press, 2001); APA–Eastern Division; Boston; December 2004.

“Dennett on Freedom,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves (Viking Press, 2003), APA–Pacific Division; Pasadena; March, 2004.

“Allen on Kane on Free Will” (commentary); APA–Eastern Division; Philadelphia; December, 2002.

“Reply to Critics,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on my Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton University Press, 2001); APA–Pacific Division; Seattle; March 2002.

“Chisholm on Freedom”; APA–Eastern Division; New York; December, 2000.

“Autonomy and History” (commentary); APA–Central Division; Chicago; April, 2000.

“Woodward’s Failed Critique of Frankfurt-style Cases” (commentary); APA–Pacific Division; Albuquerque; April, 2000

“Trying, Desiring, and Intending: Response to Chan” (commentary); APA–Eastern Division; Boston; December, 1999.

“Stueber on Mental Causation and Explanation” (commentary); APA–Central Division; New Orleans; May, 1999.

“Moral Understanding and Moral Motivation: Reply to Taggart” (commentary); APA–Eastern Division; Washington, D.C.; December, 1998.

“Flickers of Freedom,” invited paper for author-meets-critics session on John Fischer’s The Metaphysics of Free Will; APA–Central Division; Pittsburgh, April, 1997.

“Strict and Socratic Akratic Action” (invited colloquium paper) APA–Pacific Division; Berkeley; March, 1997.

“Weakness of Will” (invited colloquium paper for the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychology); APA–Eastern Division; Atlanta; December, 1996.

“Intentions and Intentional Action,” invited paper for author-meets-critics session on George Wilson’s The Intentionality of Human Action; APA–Pacific Division; Seattle; April, 1996.

“Motivating Motivated Belief,” invited paper for author-meets-critics session on George Ainslie’s Picoeconomics; APA–Pacific Division; Los Angeles; April, 1994.

“Reply to Critics,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on my Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior (Oxford University Press, 1992); APA–Pacific Division; San Francisco; March, 1993.

“Lucky Action, Intentional Action, and Action for Reasons,” APA–Pacific Division; Portland; March, 1992.

“Motivational Ties,” APA–Eastern Division; Boston; December, 1990.

“Doing What One Wants,” APA–Central Division; New Orleans; April, 1990.

“Exciting Intentions” (invited paper) APA–Central Division; Chicago; April, 1989.

“Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions,” APA–Central Division; Cincinnati; April, 1988.

“Prior Intentions Versus Intentions in Action,” APA–Pacific Division; Portland; March, 1988.

“Self-Deception and Contradictory Beliefs: Problems with Some Recent Experimental Work,” APA–Pacific Division; San Francisco; March, 1987.

“Why Do Our Intentions Move Us?” APA–Eastern Division; Boston; December, 1986.

“Incontinent Action and the Paradox of Irrationality,” APA–Central Division; St. Louis; May 3, 1986.

“Incontinent Action and the Partitioned Mind,” APA–Pacific Division; Los Angeles; March, 1986.

“Is Akratic Action Unfree?” APA–Western Division; Chicago; April 27, 1985.

“Intending and the Balance of Motivation,” APA–Pacific Division; Longbeach, CA; March 23, 1984.

Akrasia and Defeated Intentions,” APA–Western Division; Chicago, Illinois; April 30, 1983.

“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” APA–Eastern Division; Baltimore, Maryland; December 30, 1982.

 

Other Presentations

A. Schurger and A. Mele, “Intentions and Predictions,” Neurophilosophy of Free Will, June, 2021 (via Zoom).

A. Mele and M. Brass, “Free Will and the COINTOB Model of Decision Making,” Neurophilosophy of Free Will, March, 2021 (via Zoom).

“Deciding: How Special Is it?” Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, July, 2020 (via Zoom).

Discussant, “What is an Intention” and “Intentions and Intentional Actions,” Neurophilosophy of Free Will, annual meeting, July, 2020 (via Zoom).

“Actions and Intentions,” La Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, June, 2020 (via Zoom).

“Direct Versus Indirect: Control, Moral Responsibility, and Free Action,” University of Copenhagen, August, 2019.

“Are Practical Decisions Mental Actions?” University of Helsinki, August, 2019.

“Are Practical Decisions Mental Actions?” University of Tübingen, July, 2019.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: On Generalizing, Consciousness, Souls, and Restrictivism,” Lectio Magistralis, the Italian Society for Neuroethics, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, May, 2019.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, December, 2018.

“Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism,” New York University Abu Dhabi, December, 2018.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote speaker. Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, Novara, September, 2018.

“Weakness of Will,” Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, Novara, September, 2018.

“Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism,” VU University Amsterdam, June, 2018.

On Snubbing Proximal Intentions,” VU University Amsterdam, June, 2018.

“Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism,” University of Manchester, May, 2018.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Old and New,” Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, March, 2018.

“Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Agents’ Histories,” Central European University, Budapest, March, 2018.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, March, 2018.

“Self-Deception and Selectivity,” Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany, December, 2017.

“Self-Deception, Bias, and Automaticity,” Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany, December, 2017.

“Are Practical Decisions Mental Actions?” Institute of Philosophy, University of London, November, 2017.

“Self-Deception and Selectivity,” keynote speaker, University of Basel, October, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Saginaw Valley State University, October, 2017.

“Are Practical Decisions Mental Actions?” La Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, September, 2017.

“Free Will, Neuroscience, and Control,” La Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, September, 2017.

“Free Will, Neuroscience, and Consciousness,” Ghent University, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, August, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Three Persisting Problems,” Catholic University of Louvain, August, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: On Generalizing and on Souls,” Sigtuna, Sweden, June, 2017.

Speaker, salon event at the home of Susan MacTavish Best, San Francisco, July 25, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience Today,” University of Bonn, June, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Old and New,” Roma Tre University, June, 2017.

“Persisting Intentions Revisited,” University of Copenhagen, June, 2017.

“Exercising Self-control: An Apparent Problem Resolved,” Texas A&M University, May, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Old and New,” University of Arizona, April, 2017.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote speaker, University of Sydney, December, 2016.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote address, Illinois Philosophical Association, Illinois Central College, November, 2016.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Oxford, October, 2016.

“Has Science Shown That Free Will Is an Illusion?” Panel discussion with Helen Beebee and Nura Sidarus. University of Oxford, October, 2016.

“Moral Responsibility: Must Compatibilists Be Internalists?” University of Helsinki, September, 2016.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Helsinki, September, 2016.

“Radical Reversals and Original Designs,” University of Edinburgh, July, 2016.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Duke University, Summer Seminar in Neuroscience and Philosophy, June, 2016.

“Free Will, Choice, and Neuroscience,” Triennial Choice Symposium, Lake Louise, Alberta, May, 2016.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Connecticut, April, 2016.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” The College of William & Mary, March, 2016.

“Some Attractions of Causalism,” FernUniversität in Hagen; Hagen, Germany, March, 2016.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Gothenburg, November, 2015.

“Moral Responsibility: Radical Reversals and Original Designs,” University of Gothenburg, November, 2015.

Two Theories of Free Will: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane’s View,” Royal Institute of Philosophy, London, October, 2015.

“Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane’s View,” University of Manchester, October, 2015.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Washington, October, 2015.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote address, Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, September, 2015.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?” Latimer, England, August, 2015.

Mind Over Masters: The Question of Free Will,” panel discussion with Christoph Koch, Tamar Kushnir, and Azim Shariff, moderated by Emily Senay, World Science Festival, New York City, May, 2015. 

Free Will and Neuroscience,” World Science U for a Day: Evolution of Mind and Matter, World Science Festival, New York City, May, 2015. 

Discussion of Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will (Mele 2014), Science and Story Café, World Science Festival, New York City, May, 2015.

“Self-Control: A Puzzle,” Moral Psychology Research Group, Dartmouth College, April, 2015.

“Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane’s View,” Dartmouth College, April, 2015.

“On Some Unsuccessful Control-featuring Arguments Against Event-Causal Libertarianism,” University of Calgary, March, 2015.

“Luck, Control, and Free Will: Answering Berofsky,” Columbia University, March, 2015.

Free Will and Neuroscience,” Grand Valley State University, January, 2015.

            Also podcast by Australian Broadcasting Corporation, February 9, 2016. Does Free Will Exist?

“Proximal Intentions in Buridan Scenarios, Neuroscience, and Free Will,” University of Antwerp, December, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Milan, December, 2014.

“Backsliding: Response to Funke and Lake,” contribution to author-meets-critics session on my Backsliding (Oxford University Press, 2012); Florida Philosophical Association; Tampa; November, 2014.

“On the Situationist Challenge to Free Will,” Hendrix College; November, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?” Hendrix College; November, 2014.

“On the Situationist Challenge to Free Will,” Seattle Pacific University, October, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Seattle Pacific University, October, 2014.

Potential Implications of Advances in Neuroscience Research for Ethics and Moral Decision Making,” Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues; Emory University, June, 2014. 

“Losing Control: On Some Unsuccessful Arguments Against Event-causal Libertarianism,” University of Miami; April, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Tennessee, Knoxville; April, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?” Texas State University; April, 2014.

“On the Situationist Threat to Free Will,” Texas State University; March, 2014.

“Free Will: Today’s Philosophical Landscape,” University of Central Florida; March, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Central Florida; March, 2014.

“Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?” The Queen’s College, Oxford University; March, 2014.

“Synchronic Self-Control,” King’s College London; March, 2014.

“The Power of Situations, People, and Education.” Washington State University; January, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?” Potter Memorial Lecture, Washington State University; January, 2014.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?” John Templeton Foundation; Conshohocken, PA; November, 2013.

“On a Compatibilist Attempt to Solve a Problem About Luck for Libertarians,” University of Manchester; July, 2013.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?” keynote address, Graduate Student Conference, “Open Minds,”  University of Manchester; July, 2013.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?” London School of Economics; June, 2013.  

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Marist College; March, 2013.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Central European University, Budapest; January, 2013.

“Consciousness in Action: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Data, and Inferences,” International Workshop on Cognitive Science, San Sebastian, Spain, November, 2012.

“Autonomy and Beliefs,” Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics, University of Münster, October, 2012.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” SUNY-Brockport, October, 2012.

“Spinning Out of Control: On Some Unsuccessful Control-based Arguments Against Event-causal Libertarianism,” keynote address, Florida State University Graduate Student Conference on Free Will and Moral Responsibility; September, 2012.

“Intuitions and Philosophy,” Experimental Philosophy Institute, University of Arizona, July, 2012.

“Do Conscious Decisions Ever Play a Role in Action Production?” Université du Québec à Montréal; July, 2012.

“Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting,” Central European University, Budapest; June, 2012.

“Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Institute of Philosophy, London; May, 2012.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Three Techniques and Two Common Problems,” University of Padua; May, 2012.

“Unconscious Decisions, Conscious Reasoning, and Free Will.” Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano; May, 2012.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Back to the Drawing Board,” University of Delaware; March, 2012.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Florida State University, Physics Department; February, 2012.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Back to the Drawing Board,” University of Notre Dame; November, 2011.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Back to the Drawing Board,” University College Dublin; November, 2011.

Panelist, “The Science and Philosophy of Free Will,” New York City; November, 2011.

“Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding,” University of Southern California Law School; October 2011.

“Autonomy, Moral Responsibility, and the Continuation Problem,” Ludwig - Maximilians - Universität; Munich; September, 2011.

“A Model of Conscious Deciding.” Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness; Kyoto University; June, 2011.

“Free Will and Substance Dualism: the Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Duke University; April, 2011.

“Free Will and the Neurosciences.” University of Southern Mississippi, November, 2010.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet’s Studies.” Florida State University, College of Medicine, November, 2010.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet’s Studies.” IESE Business School, Barcelona, October, 2010.

“Free Will: Theories and More.” Brown University, Psychology Department, October, 2010.

“Free Will and Neuroscience.” Florida State University, College of Medicine, October, 2010.

“Free Will, Science, and Law.” Peking University, Beijing, September, 2010.

“Free Will and Neuroscience.” SunYat-Sen University, Guangzhou, September, 2010.

“Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action.” University of Potsdam, July, 2010.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote address, Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, William and Mary School of Law, Williamsburg, April, 2010.

“Autonomy and Neuroscience.” University of Miami, March, 2010.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Washington University in St. Louis, November, 2009.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Princeton University, October, 2009.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Wayne State University, October, 2009.

“Is Free Will an Illusion?” Royal Institution of Great Britain, London, September, 2009.

“Weakness of Will and Akrasia,” Utrecht University, September, 2009.

“Investigating Free Will,” Templeton Retreat: Science of Free Will, Columbia University, July, 2009.

“Yours to Decide: Fate, Free Will, Neither or Both?” Panel discussion with Patrick Haggard and Daniel Wegner; moderated by Paul Nurse. World Science Festival, New York City, June, 2009.

“Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge,” Delmenhorst, Germany, June, 2009.

“Free Will,” University of Richmond, April, 2009.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Deciding, Vetoing, and the Timing of Conscious Intentions,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Savannah, April, 2009.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Centenary College, March, 2009.

“Free Will Today,” Davidson College, November, 2008.

“Testing Free Will,” College of William & Mary, September, 2008.

“Vetoing and Awareness,” University of Edinburgh, June, 2008.

“Free Will, Neuroscience, and Social Psychology,” Free Will and Neuroscience Workshop, Banff, Canada, May, 2008.

“Decisions, Intentions, and Consciousness,” Conscious Process and Free Action Conference, Amelia Island, FL, April, 2008.

“Vetoing and Awareness,” Tribute to Benjamin Libet Workshop, Tucson, April, 2008.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Franklin and Marshall College, March, 2008.

“Moral Responsibility and Agents’ Histories,” VU University Amsterdam, March, 2008.

“Why Be Skeptical about Free Will?” Western Missouri State University; February, 2008.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of North Florida; December, 2007.

“Moral Responsibility and Agents’ Histories,” Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt; November, 2007.

“Moral Responsibility and Agents’ Histories,” Indiana University; September, 2007.

“Fundamental Problems in the Theory of Action,” Cargèse School on Consciousness: Consciousness & Action, Cargèse, France; June, 2007.

“Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience,” Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières; May, 2007.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Davidson College; April, 2007.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Simon Fraser University; March, 2007.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Cologne; February, 2007.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt; February, 2007.

“Conscious Intentions and ‘the Illusion of Conscious Will’,” University of Birmingham; January, 2007.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of California–Riverside, December, 2006.

“Conscious Intentions and ‘the Illusion of Conscious Will’,” University of Maryland; October, 2006.

“Conscious Intentions,” University of Potsdam; September, 2006.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Stanford University; May, 2006.

“Conscious Intentions,” Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference; Washington State University, April, 2006.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Oxford, Jowett Philosophical Society, November, 2005.

“Reasonology and False Beliefs,” University of Birmingham, November, 2005.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Birmingham (Psychology Department), November, 2005.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Syracuse University, November, 2005.

“Self-Deception and Three Emotional Delusions,” Georgia State University, October, 2005.

“Free Will: Theories, Analysis, and Data,” National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, August, 2005.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote address, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Sydney, July, 2005.

“Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited,” University of Trento (Italy), June, 2005.

“Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited,” Texas Tech University, April, 2005.

“Free Will: The Current State of the Debate,” Texas Tech University, April, 2005.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote address, North Texas Philosophical Association, Dallas, April, 2005.

“Free Will and Luck,” Southern Methodist University, April, 2005.

“Action Theory: Some Puzzles,” University of Bucharest (Law School), April, 2005.

“Free Will and Luck,” University of Bucharest (Philosophy Dept.), April, 2005.

“Free Will: The Current State of the Debate,” University of Bucharest (Philosophy Dept.), April, 2005.

“Action Theory, Free Will, and Neuroscience,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, April, 2005.

“Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience,” University of Siena, March, 2005.

“Free Will and Neuroscience, University of Florida, February, 2005.

“Self-Deception and Delusion,” Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Sydney, Australia, November, 2004.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Cincinnati, October, 2004.

“Akratic Action and Libertarianism,” Catholic University of America, September, 2004.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Calgary, September, 2004.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Helsinki, June, 2004.

“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Oregon (Psychology Department), October, 2003.

“Intentional Action: Data, Concepts, and Theories,” University of Oregon (Psychology Department), October, 2003.

“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” Mercatus Center, George Mason University, October, 2003.

“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University College London, June, 2003.

“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,”University of Hertfordshire, June, 2003.

“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Dundee, June, 2003.

“Why Are Decisions Intentional?” University of Glasgow, June, 2003.

“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Edinburgh, June, 2003.

“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Manchester, June, 2003.

“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Stirling, June, 2003.

“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference; Washington State University, May, 2003.

“Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses.” University of San Francisco, April, 2003.

“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Miami, March, 2003.

“Intentional Action.” Florida State University Law School, March, 2003.

“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” Munich Philosophical Lecture Series: On the Nature and Culture of Volition, Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, February, 2003.

“Autonomy and Akrasia,” University of Helsinki, September, 2002.

“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference, Action and Agency, University of Oxford, September, 2002.

“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, May, 2002.

“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” Bielefeld University, May, 2002.

“Explaining Negative Actions,” International Congress: Causation and Explanation in Natural and Social Sciences,” Ghent University, Belgium, May, 2002.

“Akratics and Addicts,” Tilburg University, Netherlands, May, 2002.

“Agents’ Abilities,” Cornell University, April, 2002.

“Weakness of Will,” Ithaca College, April, 2002.

“Akratics and Addicts,” SUNY–Stony Brook, April, 2002.

“Agents’ Abilities,” University of Colorado at Boulder, March, 2002.

“Agents’ Abilities,” University of Miami, January, 2002.

“Free Will: The Current State of the Debate,” Davidson College, November, 2001.

“Reply to Commentators” (P. Dalton, R. Hilpinen, C. Thorpe), author-meets-critics session on my Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton, 2001), Florida Philosophical Association,” DeLand, FL, November, 2001.

“Agents’ Abilities,” Florida State University, November, 2001.

“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference, Philosophy and the Emotions, Manchester, July, 2001.

“Human Action Par Excellence,” Mind and Action III, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), May, 2001.

“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.

“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.

“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of Konstanz, Intentionality Center, May, 2001.

“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Keele, May, 2001.

“Weakness of Will,” University of Birmingham Law School, May, 2001.

“Free Will,” University of Manchester, May, 2001.

“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, University of Idaho, April, 2001.

“Free Will: The Current State of the Debate,” Florida State University, April, 2001.

“Weakness of Will,” University of Minnesota–Morris, April, 2001.

“Negative Actions,” University of Minnesota–Morris, April, 2001.

“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Scripps College, March, 2001.

“Freedom and Philosophy,” Dowling College, March, 2001.

“Responsibility and Freedom,” University of Richmond, December, 2000.

“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Australian National University, November, 2000.

“Humean Compatibilism” (with H. Beebee), Australian National University, November, 2000.

“Human Agency Par Excellence,” University of Florida, October, 2000.

“Disappearing Agents and Master Desires,” University of Manchester, May, 2000.

“Causal Theories of Action and Deviant Causal Chains,” University of Edinburgh, May, 2000.

“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Glasgow, May, 2000.

“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.

“Executive States,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.

“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.

“Human Agency Par Excellence,” University of Georgia, April, 2000.

“Moral Motivation: Internalism vs. Externalism,” University of Sheffield, 2-25-00.

“Deciding,” University of Manchester, 2-23-00.

“Self-Deception and Emotion,” University of Stirling, 2-19-00.

“Deciding,” University of Durham, 2-17-00.

“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University of Keele, 2-11-00.

“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Birkbeck College, University of London, 2-10-00.

“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University of Reading, 2-8-00.

“Goal-Directed Action,” University of Texas – Austin, 10-14-99.

“Goal-Directed Action,” Southern Methodist University, 10-13-99.

“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Texas A&M University, 10-12-99.

“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Florida State University, 10-1-99.

“Weakness of Will,” Bryn Mawr, September, 1999.

“Goal-Directed Action,” University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, 8-27-99.

“Motivational Strength and Control,” University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 8-25-99.

“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8-24-99.

“Goal-Directed Action,” Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, 8-20-99.

“Weakness of Will,” LaTrobe University, Melbourne, Australia, 8-18-99.

“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia 8-13-99.

“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Australian National University, 8-7-99.

“Goal-Directed Action,” Australian National University, 7-29-99.

“Weakness of Will,” Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, 7-13-99.

“Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations and Causal Theories,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, April, 1999.

“Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility,” University of Oregon (Psychology conference on intentionality), October, 1998.

“Motivation, Self-Control, and the Agglomeration of Desires,” World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, August, 1998.

“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,” Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), July, 1998.

“Ultimate Responsibility,” Uppsala University (Sweden), May, 1998.

“Motivated Belief and Agency,” University of Helsinki (Finland), May, 1998.

“Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” University of Helsinki (Finland), May, 1998.

“Ultimate Responsibility,” Social Philosophy & Policy Center, Bowling Green State University, April, 1998.

“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,” Université du Québec à Montréal, October, 1997.

“Ultimate Responsibility,” Wayne State University, September, 1997.

“Frankfurt-style Cases and Freedom,” Johns Hopkins University, April, 1997.

“Soft Libertarianism,” Washington University–St. Louis, March, 1997.

“Agency and Mental Action,” University of Missouri–St. Louis, March, 1997.

“Strength of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from Libet,” Wake Forest University, March, 1997.

“Moral Theory, Motivation, and Listlessness,” North Carolina Philosophical Society, Elon College, February, 1997.

“Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Scenarios,” Texas A&M University, September, 1996.

“Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Scenarios,” University of Texas–Austin, September, 1996.

“Self-Deception and the Emotions,” International Society for Research on Emotion, University of Toronto, August 1996.

“Weakness of Will: Strict and Socratic Akratic Action,” keynote address, Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry, New York, May, 1996.

“Is There a Place for Intention in an Analysis of Intentional Action?” North Carolina Philosophical Society, University of North Carolina–Charlotte, February, 1996.

“Addiction and Self-Control,” Oslo, Norway, May, 1995.

“Real Self-Deception,” Mount Holyoke College, February 1995.

“Agency and Mental Action,” Dartmouth, February, 1995.

“Real Self-Deception,” Université du Québec à Montréal, September, 1994.

“Real Self-Deception,” University of Alabama, April, 1994.

“Effective Deliberation About What to Intend,” North Carolina Philosophical Society, Davidson College, February, 1994.

“Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception,” Stanford University, February, 1993.

“Better Judgment: Nature and Function,” CSLI/Stanford University, February, 1993.

“Incompatibilist Autonomy and Autonomous Action,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, January, 1993.

“Psychological Autonomy and Personal History,” Triangle Ethics Group, Chapel Hill, January 1993.

“Intentions and Literature: Realism or Antirealism,” Duke University, November, 1992.

“Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle,” Université du Québec à Montréal, October, 1992.

“Davidsonian Intentions,” Literature and Philosophy Conference, “Passions, Persons, and Powers,” University of California–Berkeley, May, 1992.

“Reply to Critics,” contribution to symposium on my Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior (Oxford University Press, 1992), Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Memphis, April, 1992.

“Autonomous Agents and Agents’ Histories,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, January, 1992.

“Intentional Realism and Literary Theory,” Modern Language Association, San Francisco, December, 1991.

“Autonomous Agents and Agents’ Histories,” McGill University, November, 1991.

“Intentional Realism and Literary Theory,” McGill University, October, 1991.

“Tolerance and Integrity” (commentary), Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Atlanta, March, 1991.

“Self-Deception,” Rutgers University, March, 1991.

“Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle,” Rutgers University, February, 1991.

“Doing What One Wants,” Mark Overvold Memorial Conference, St. Olaf College, October, 1990.

“Intentional Action and the Causal Relevance of the Mental,” Brown University (guest presentation to J. Kim’s NEH Summer Seminar on Supervenience), August, 1990.

“On the Possibility of Self-Control” (commentary), Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Louisville, April, 1990.

“Intentional Action and the Causal Relevance of the Mental,” East Carolina University, April, 1990.

“Intentions by Default,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, March, 1989.

“Exciting Intentions” (Presidential Address), North Carolina Philosophical Society, Davidson College, February, 1989.

“Debunking the Intention/Volition Debate” (with F. Adams), International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, Austria, August, 1989. (Presented by F. Adams.)

“Errant Self-Control and the Self-Controlled Person,” St. Andrews College, November, 1988.

“Irresistible Desires,” Bowling Green State University, October, 1988.

“Incorrigibility” (commentary), Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Chapel Hill, May, 1988.

“Exciting Intentions,” Central Michigan University, April, 1988.

“Irrationality,” contribution to symposium on my Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control (Oxford University Press, 1987), Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Miami, March, 1988.

“Debunking the Intention/Volition Debate” (with F. Adams), Illinois Philosophical Association, Lisle, November, 1988. (Presented by F. Adams.)

Akrasia and Plato’s Protagoras,” Virginia Commonwealth University, April, 1986.

“Self-Deception, Contradictory Beliefs, and Quattrone and Tversky’s Cold Water Experiment,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Knoxville, March, 1986.

“Strict Akratic Action: A Paradox of Irrationality,” University of Michigan, January, 1986.

“Incontinent Believing,” Virginia Commonwealth University, April, 1985.

“Is Akratic Action Unfree?” Randolph-Macon College, April, 1985.

“Is Akratic Action Unfree?” North Carolina Philosophical Society, Raleigh, February, 1985.

“Self-Control, Action, and Belief,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Columbia, SC, April, 1984.

Akrasia and Defeated Intentions,” North Carolina Philosophical Society, Greensboro, April, 1983.

Akrasia and Defeated Intentions,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Atlanta, April, 1983.

“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” American Catholic Philosophical Association, Houston, April, 1982.

“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Fort Worth, April, 1982.

“Aristotle on Practical Wisdom: The Roles of Phronesis in Motivation,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Louisville, April, 1981.

“Audi’s ‘Self-Deception, Action, and Will’: Comments,” University of North Carolina-Greensboro’s Annual Symposium in Philosophy, Greensboro, March, 1981.

“Happiness, Goodness, and Desire in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Birmingham, April, 1980.

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