2019 Werkmeister Conference: Identifying Persons
Friday, Feb. 15 and Saturday, Feb. 16
Ordinary objects have conditions of identity over time, but only a person can be said to have an identity -- in the sense that invites talk of identity crises, of questioning or changing one's identity, of discovering who one really is.
Ordinary objects can remain selfsame despite changes in their appearance, but only a person can be (or fail to be) herself, be true or false to herself, have a "deep" self that may be different from the face she shows to others.
What do these words express, and what can they reveal about our concept of a person? Questions like these have been thematized in phenomenology, in psychology, and to some extent in analytic moral theory, but they have been given less attention by analytic philosophers of mind. The present conference will bring into conversation philosophers and psychologists who can approach questions of self and self-identity from a variety of perspectives.
Matthew Boyle (Chicago)
Vincent Descombes (EHESS, Paris)
Joshua Knobe (Yale)
Christopher Moore (Penn State)
Ursula Renz (Klagenfurt)
Marya Schechtman (Illinois-Chicago)
John Schwenkler (Florida State)
Nina Strohminger (Penn)
Andrea Westlund (Florida State)
Sponsored by the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Fund, and the Florida State University College of Arts and Sciences.
Tucker Sigourney — email@example.com